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Article

Casual Ostracism: Jury Exclusion on the
Basis of Criminal Convictions
†

Anna Roberts

INTRODUCTION
In the early 1960s, a teenager named Frank Johnson appeared in a municipal court in Texas, where he was found
1
guilty of theft of less than five dollars. He was thirteen or four2
teen, and his punishment was a fifty dollar fine.
Twenty years later, Mr. Johnson received a summons for
3
jury duty. The prosecution asserted that his twenty-year-old
conviction disqualified him, and over the objection of the de4
fense the court excused him. The court did not consider the
passage of time, or the smallness of the sum, or anything about
5
Mr. Johnson as an adult. Under the Texas disqualification
statute—then, as now—a conviction of misdemeanor theft pre6
cludes jury service for life.
† Assistant Professor, Seattle University School of Law; J.D., New York
University School of Law; B.A., University of Cambridge. My thanks for helpful feedback to Amna Akbar, Bridgette Baldwin, Mary Bowman, Robert
Chang, Margaret Chon, Brooke Coleman, Peggy Cooper Davis, Diane Dick,
Andrew Ferguson, James Forman Jr., Charlotte Garden, Lauryn Gouldin,
Elizabeth Henneke, Brian Kalt, John Mitchell, Janet Moore, Dean Olsher,
Karena Rahall, Candis Roberts, Meghan Ryan, Julie Shapiro, Giovanna Shay,
Kim Taylor-Thompson, and to those present at the Law & Society Association
Conference panels, the AALS Criminal Justice Section Workshops, and the
N.Y.U. Lawyering Scholarship Colloquium at which I presented my research. I
offer my deep appreciation to Alexandra Caggiano, Dashiell DeJarnatt, Kevin
Frick, Tracy Huang, Max Kaplan, Caitlin Naidoff, Brian Starr, and Kevin Terry, for their research assistance, and to Inga Nelson, Josh Porte, and the
members of the Minnesota Law Review for their editorial work. Copyright ©
2013 by Anna Roberts.
1. See Frame v. State, 615 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
2. Id.
3. See id. at 769.
4. Id. at 768.
5. See id. at 768–69.
6. See TEX. CODE ANN. § 62.102 (2013) (“A person is disqualified to serve
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This Article addresses the exclusion from criminal jury
7
service of those who have a criminal record. Statutory exclusions are in place in the federal system and in forty-eight
8
states : while the majority of them address felony convictions,
thirteen—as in the case of Texas—provide for the disqualifica9
tion of at least some people with misdemeanor convictions. Extending beyond statutory disqualifications are several other
means by which a conviction can be used to preclude jury service in the absence of any showing of bias: the selective mailing
10
11
of jury summonses, the exercise of peremptory challenges,
12
and the granting of challenges for cause. The combination of
the breadth of these exclusions and the thinness of their justifications offers a prime example of, as James Forman puts it,
“how casually, almost carelessly, our society ostracizes offend13
ers.”
This Article rejects casual and careless ostracism in favor
of a careful analysis of the costs and benefits of this type of civic
exclusion. This analysis incorporates three broader policy critiques that are currently being leveled at the criminal justice
14
system but that have not yet been applied to jury exclusion. It
shows how they can inform, and be informed by, critiques of
this type of jury exclusion.
as a petit juror unless the person . . . (7) has not been convicted of misdemeanor theft or a felony . . . .”).
7. Exclusions of those with criminal convictions from civil jury service
are also prevalent, but beyond the scope of this Article. See Brian C. Kalt, The
Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65 app. 1 at 168–69
(2003).
8. See infra Part I.B.
9. See infra notes 39–42.
10. See infra Part I.A.
11. See infra Part I.D.
12. See infra Part I.C. The reach of jury exclusions relating to the criminal
justice system extends beyond the scope of this article, to include those who
have merely been arrested or charged, Anna Roberts, Disparately Seeking Jurors: Disparate Impact and the (Mis)use of Batson, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1359, 1375, 1408 (2012) [hereinafter Roberts, Disparately Seeking Jurors], and
those whose family members have had experience with the criminal justice
system, see id. at 1375, 1403–04. Exclusions from grand jury service are also
beyond the scope of this article. See Kalt, supra note 7, at 168–69.
13. James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the
New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 27 (2012). My thanks to Professor Forman for allowing me to adapt his phrase.
14. This Article leaves to one side constitutional arguments analyzing
statutory exclusions in relation to the guarantee of an “impartial jury” and a
“fair cross-section”; they are compelling, but have been handled (at least as
regards felony convictions) elsewhere. See, e.g., Kalt, supra note 7, at 70–100.
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First, the sizeable and growing body of research into the
characteristics of wrongful conviction cases indicates that jurors have, in many cases, failed to understand central aspects
15
of the criminal justice system. This lack of understanding undermines the unquestioning exclusion of those with firsthand
experience of the system. Second, recent scholarship has identified the adjustment of prosecutorial incentives as a key compo16
nent of criminal justice reform. This Article adds jury exclusion to that literature, critiquing and proposing adjustments to
a system in which the state can remove from the jury, without
cost to itself, those who are presumed to be embittered against
the state. Third, Alexandra Natapoff has highlighted the “silencing of criminal defendants” at various points in the crimi17
nal process as an obstacle to reform. This Article extends her
critique to the process of jury selection.
Part I compiles the various means by which criminal convictions are used as a basis for jury exclusion. Part II examines
the impact of these exclusions, focusing on three of the main
harms. Part III investigates whether the justifications that are
given for these exclusions outweigh the harms. Part IV recommends the abandonment of automatic exclusions on the basis of
criminal convictions: they lack sufficient justification, and permit the state to remove, without cost to itself, those assumed to
be embittered against the state.
I. THE EXCLUSIONS
This Part lays out the multiple methods by which potential
jurors are excluded on the basis of criminal convictions: selective mailing of jury summonses, statutory disqualifications,
challenges for cause, and peremptory challenges. It demon-

15. See Alexandra Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute
to Wrongful Convictions, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 107, 113 (2006) [hereinafter Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable] (“[I]nformants may have an air of ‘inside
knowledge’ about the crime that may sway the jury, an air that is not easily
dispelled by cautionary instructions. Indeed, the prevalence of wrongful convictions based on snitch testimony demonstrates that juries often believe informants.” (footnote omitted)); The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENCE
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/ (including as main
contributing causes of wrongful convictions in DNA exonerations “[f]alse
[c]onfessions/[a]dmissions,” “[i]nformants or [s]nitches,” and “[g]overnment
[m]isconduct”) (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
16. See infra notes 275–82.
17. Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449, 1449 (2005) [hereinafter Natapoff, Speechless].
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strates both their cumulative effect and the wide variety of approaches that different jurisdictions take.
A. JURY SUMMONSES
Lists of potential jurors are compiled largely (and in the
18
federal system often exclusively) from voter registration rolls.
In forty-eight states, those with felony convictions face some re19
striction of their voting rights. Where these restrictions result
in erasure from the voting rolls, those with felony convictions
20
will not receive a jury summons.
B. STATUTORY DISQUALIFICATIONS
Colorado and Maine are the only two states without any
statutory provisions permitting the exclusion of potential jurors
21
on the basis of criminal convictions. Iowa is the only state
whose statutory regime merely provides for dismissals for
22
cause on this basis : as will be discussed in Part C, this is not
18. Andrew D. Leipold, Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in Criminal
Cases: A Critical Evaluation, 86 GEO. L.J. 945, 970 (1998) (“Federal courts now
use voter lists as the primary (often exclusive) source for juror names, despite
significant evidence that this method results in the underrepresentation of
some groups.”); Alexander E. Preller, Note, Jury Duty Is a Poll Tax: The Case
for Severing the Link Between Voter Registration and Jury Service, 46 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 2 (2012) (“[F]orty-two out of fifty states use voter registration lists to form jury lists . . . .”).
19. See Criminal Disenfranchisement Laws Across the United States,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, NYU, http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/legacy/d/download_file_48642.pdf (May, 2007) (indicating that only two states, Maine and Vermont, have no restrictions on the basis of criminal
convictions). A word about nomenclature. I will follow Margaret Colgate Love
in avoiding the word “felon.” Margaret Colgate Love, What’s in a Name? A Lot,
When the Name Is “Felon”, THE CRIME REPORT (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www
.thecrimereport.org/viewpoints/2012-03-whats-in-a-name-a-lot-when-the-name
-is-felon (describing the term “felon” as an “ugly” and “unhelpful label”).
20. See United States v. Manbeck, 514 F. Supp. 141, 146 (D.S.C. 1981).
21. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-71-105 (2013); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 1211
(2013); see Kalt, supra note 7, at app. 1A (giving a survey of all fifty states’ and
federal policies on juror disqualification on the basis of felony convictions).
Both states deleted such provisions in the 1980s. See Act of Apr. 28–29, 1982,
ch. 705, pt. G, sec. 4, § 1211, 1981 Me. Laws 1263 (deleting language disqualifying those who have lost the vote because of a criminal conviction); People v.
Ellis, 148 P.3d 205, 209 (Colo. App. 2006) (“Prior to the repeal and reenactment of the Colorado Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act in 1989, a convicted felon was not allowed to serve on a jury, unless his or her right to vote
had been restored. The current and applicable version of the act no longer disqualifies convicted felons whose voting rights have not been restored from
serving on a jury.”).
22. IOWA R. CRIM. P. § 2.18(5)(a) (2013); see Kalt, supra note 7, at app. 1A.
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an automatic exclusion, but permits the judge some discretion.
The remaining jurisdictions permit certain criminal records to
act as a disqualification: jurors who are disqualified are automatically deemed unfit, and are not even supposed to reach the
jury box.
In forty-seven states and the federal system, disqualification from jury service of those with a felony record is provided
23
for by statute. While in some jurisdictions, this exclusion ap24
plies to all felonies and lasts forever, many qualify the disqualification in some way. The disqualification may end at the
25
26
same time as one’s imprisonment, or sentence, or if one is
27
28
29
able to obtain an amnesty, annulment, expunction, par30
31
32
don, reversal, or restoration of civil rights. The disqualifica33
tion may be triggered only by a particular type of felony, by
34
incarceration, or only by incarceration for a certain period of
35
time. The disqualification may last for only a certain period of
36
37
years after conviction, or after completion of one’s sentence.
38
Each jurisdiction makes the cut differently.
23. See Kalt, supra note 7, at app. 1A.
24. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.1307a(1)(e) (2013).
25. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27-35 (2013).
26. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-5-1 (2013).
27. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4502(a)(3) (2013).
28. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 500-A:6 (2013).
29. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-1-105(2) (2013).
30. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 612-4(b)(2) (2013).
31. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 2961.01(A)(1) (2013).
32. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5) (2006). This restoration may happen
automatically, see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 13-1 (2013), or require an affirmative act by the person seeking the restoration, see, e.g., United States v. Barlow, 732 F. Supp. 2d 1, 39 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
33. See ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 177 (limiting voting rights of those “convicted of a felony of moral turpitude”); ALA. CODE § 12-16-60(a) (2013) (qualifying for jury service only one who “is generally reputed to be honest and intelligent and is esteemed in the community for integrity, good character and sound
judgment” and who “[h]as not lost the right to vote by conviction for any offense involving moral turpitude”).
34. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-217(a)(2) (2013) (disqualifying from
jury service anyone who is “in the custody of the Commissioner of Correction”).
35. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-103(b)(4) (West 2012) (disqualifying individuals who have been convicted of a crime “punishable by imprisonment exceeding 6 months and received a sentence of imprisonment for
more than 6 months”).
36. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-217(a)(2) (2013) (seven years); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 43-158(c) (2012) (ten years).
37. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 10.030(3)(E) (2013) (fifteen years).
38. States are divided, for example, on whether a no contest plea man-
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The disqualifications go beyond felony convictions: statutory provisions in thirteen states make those with certain mis39
demeanor convictions vulnerable to disqualification. Those
40
states may limit the disqualification by type of conviction, by
41
type of sentence, or by whether the person is currently in cus42
tody. Again, each jurisdiction makes the cut differently.
dates exclusion. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-95(c) (2012) (no), with KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 43-158(c) (yes).
39. W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1; ALA. CODE § 12-16-60(a) (2013); CAL. CIV.
PROC. § 203(a)(5) (West 2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-217(a)(2) (2013); FLA.
STAT. § 40.013(1) (2013); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/2(3) (2007); MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. LAW § 9-202 (LexisNexis 2013); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-1 (2013);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-15-303(2) (2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2B:20-1(e) (West
2013); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10.030(3)(F) (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-1-102
(2013); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 62.102 (2013); W. VA. CODE § 3-1-3 (2011); W.
VA. CODE § 52-1-8(b)(5) (2008). In Alabama, a prospective juror must be,
among other things, “generally reputed to be honest and intelligent” and “esteemed in the community for integrity, good character and sound judgment.”
ALA. CODE § 12-16-60(a) (2013). On appeal, an Alabama court upheld the invocation of this provision to support the exclusion of a juror who had merely
been arrested. See Dobyne v. State, 672 So. 2d 1319, 1331 (Ala. Crim. App.
1994). This willingness to uphold the exclusion of someone merely arrested
(for an unstated offense) supports the argument that the provision is also
available to justify the exclusion of someone with a misdemeanor conviction.
For the fact that Connecticut’s provision, which disqualifies those in the custody of the Commissioner of Correction, encompasses those who are imprisoned for a misdemeanor conviction, see section 51-217(a)(2) of the General
Statutes of Connecticut; E-mail from the Office of Pub. Info., Conn. Dep’t of
Corr. to Anna Roberts, Assistant Professor of Law, Seattle Univ. Sch. of Law
(Dec. 28, 2012, 05:38 PST) (on file with author) (confirming that those under
sentence for a misdemeanor conviction are housed within the Connecticut Department of Correction).
40. See CAL. CIV. PROC. § 203(a)(5) (West 2013) (disqualifying those “who
have been convicted of malfeasance in office or a felony, and whose civil rights
have not been restored”); FLA. STAT. § 40.013(1) (2013) (disqualifying those
convicted of “bribery, forgery, perjury, [or] larceny”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
LAW § 9-202 (LexisNexis 2013) (disqualifying those convicted of bribing or attempting to bribe a juror); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-1 (2013) (excluding those
convicted of “the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors within a period of five
years” and the “common gambler or habitual drunkard”); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 3-15-303(2) (2013) (excluding those convicted of “malfeasance in office”); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2B:20-1(e) (West 2013) (excluding those convicted of “any indictable offense”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10.030(F) (2012) (excluding those convicted of a “misdemeanor involving violence or dishonesty”); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 22-1-102 (2013) (excluding those convicted of “perjury or subornation of perjury”); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 62.102(7) (2013) (excluding those convicted of
“misdemeanor theft”); W. VA. CODE § 52-1-8(b)(6) (2008) (excluding those convicted of perjury or false swearing). Mississippi also requires jurors to be “either a qualified elector, or a resident freeholder of the county for more than
one year.” MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-1 (2013); see infra note 44.
41. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-103(b)(4)–(5) (LexisNexis
2013) (disqualifying those convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment

598

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:592

Aside from statutory provisions that explicitly base disqualifications on convictions, several provisions that make no
mention of disqualification on the basis of criminal record can
have that effect indirectly. Some states, for example, limit jury
43
service to those who are “qualified elector[s],” thus allowing
any conviction-based disqualifications from voting to bring
44
about secondary disqualifications from jury service. Other
states make use of vague terms that can encompass criminal
convictions. Illinois requires that jurors be “[f]ree from all legal
exception, of fair character, of approved integrity, of sound
45
judgment.” In Alabama, an individual may qualify for jury
service only if he or she “is generally reputed to be honest and
intelligent and is esteemed in the community for integrity, good
46
character and sound judgment”; even if this standard is met, a

exceeding 6 months” and who “received a sentence of imprisonment for more
than 6 months”).
42. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-217(a)(2) (2013) (excluding those who are
“in the custody of the Commissioner of Correction,” a group that includes those
imprisoned for misdemeanors). For the fact that Connecticut’s provision encompasses those who are imprisoned for a misdemeanor conviction, see supra
note 39.
43. MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-1 (2013); see, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 52-1-8(b)(5)
(2008) (disqualifying anyone who has lost the right to vote because of a criminal conviction).
44. See ALA. CODE § 12-16-60(a) (2013) (qualifying for jury service only
one who “[h]as not lost the right to vote by conviction for any offense involving
moral turpitude”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-33-01 (2013) (stating that those
“sentenced for a felony to a term of imprisonment, during the term of actual
incarceration under such sentence” may not vote); id. § 27-09.1-08 (2013) (stating that a prospective juror is disqualified if he or she “[h]as lost the right to
vote because of imprisonment in the penitentiary . . . or conviction of a criminal offense which by special provision of law disqualified the prospective juror
for such service”). Mississippi requires each juror to be “either a qualified elector, or a resident freeholder of the county for more than one year,” thus connecting jury exclusion to disenfranchisement, which befalls those convicted of
“murder, rape, bribery, theft, arson, obtaining money or goods under false pretense, perjury, forgery, embezzlement or bigamy.” MISS. CONST. art. XII,
§ 241; MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-1 (2013).
45. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/2 (2007). Illinois courts have interpreted this
language, variously, as banning all those who have previously been “charged
with various crimes,” People v. Gil, 608 N.E.2d 197, 206 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992);
barring all those with criminal records; and referring only to those with “recent or extensive criminal histories.” See Kalt, supra note 7, at 152 n.389.
46. ALA. CODE § 12-16-60(a) (2013). On appeal, an Alabama court upheld,
as not erroneous, the invocation of this provision to support the exclusion of a
juror who had merely been arrested. See Dobyne v. State, 672 So. 2d 1319,
1331 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994). This willingness to uphold the exclusion of someone merely arrested (for some unstated offense) supports the notion that the
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juror may be disqualified from jury service if a conviction for a
“crime involving moral turpitude” prevents him or her from vot47
ing.
Thus jurisdictions approach this question differently, disagreeing on whether there should be automatic statutory disqualifications at all; whether, if they exist, they should include
some or all misdemeanors; whether they should last forever;
and what type of conviction or punishment should trigger them.
As one federal judge has suggested, these types of differences
48
“make[] the ban seem somewhat arbitrary.”
C. CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE
Once a group of potential jurors makes it into the jury box
for questioning by the attorneys, the next possible means of exclusion is the challenge for cause. Challenges for cause are
available in unlimited number, provided that the trial judge is
persuaded that the jurors in question cannot, for example,
49
“fairly and adequately fulfill [their] responsibilities.”
Challenges for cause offer a variety of ways in which a juror’s criminal record can be a basis for his or her exclusion.
First, they may be established by statute as a way of enforcing
50
the statutory disqualifications mentioned above. Second, they
may be established by statute as a way of extending, or replacing, statutory disqualifications. In Alabama, for example, the
statutory disqualification applies only to those who have been

provision is also available to justify the exclusion of someone with a conviction.
See also supra note 39.
47. ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182; see also ALA. CODE § 12-16-60(a)(4)
(2013) (barring from jury service those who have “lost the right to vote by conviction for any offense involving moral turpitude”); Chapman v. Gooden, 974
So. 2d 972, 976–77 (Ala. 2007) (discussing which crimes might be felonies involving moral turpitude).
48. United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Randolph,
J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“That a felon could be . . . incompetent in a federal court in one state but competent in another, makes the
ban seem somewhat arbitrary.”).
49. See SENATE FISCAL AGENCY, JUROR COMPENSATION AND QUALIFICATION: SENATE FISCAL AGENCY BILL ANALYSIS: S.B. 1448 & 1452 AND H.B.
4551-4553 ENROLLED ANALYSIS, 91st Leg., 5th Sess., at 5 (Mich. 2003) [hereinafter JUROR COMPENSATION AND QUALIFICATION], available at http://
legislature.mi.gov/documents/2001-2002/billanalysis/Senate/pdf/2001-SFA
-1448-E.pdf (implying that challenges for cause are unlimited but peremptory
challenges, by contrast, are limited).
50. See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 2.511(D) (“It is grounds for a challenge for cause
that the person: (1) is not qualified to be a juror . . . .”).
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convicted of a crime “involving moral turpitude.” Any felony
conviction is a good ground for a challenge for cause, however,
52
53
whether turpitudinous or not. As mentioned above, Iowa has
no statutory disqualifications but permits the removal for cause
54
of those with a felony conviction. Third, they may be granted
on the basis of a criminal conviction even where there is no
statutory provision establishing this as a basis for a challenge
55
for cause.
A challenge for cause based on a criminal conviction may
or may not rely on the judge’s discretion. If a juror “admits partiality” stemming from a criminal conviction, the judge has
56
broad discretion to grant the challenge; in other instances
statute may require the granting of the challenge (even in the
57
absence of any demonstrated bias), or the granting may be in
58
the judge’s discretion. North Dakota, on the other hand, has
explicitly rejected the idea that a felony conviction in and of itself is grounds for a challenge for cause. Having repealed an
earlier legislative provision that made those with felony convictions permanently vulnerable to a cause challenge, the state
51. ALA. CODE § 12-16-60(a) (2013).
52. ALA. CODE § 12-16-150(5) (2013). Similarly, in Oklahoma the statutory disqualification applies only to those who (a) have been convicted of a felony
and (b) have not had their civil rights restored. OKLA. STAT. tit. 38, § 28(C)(5)
(2013). By contrast, a judge may grant a cause challenge solely on the basis of
a felony conviction. Id. at tit. 22, § 658 (2013).
53. See supra note 2223 and accompanying text.
54. See IOWA CT. R. 1.915(6)(a), 2.18(5)(a).
55. See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE FIN. COMM., FISCAL IMPACT REPORT, H.R. 47531, 2d Sess., at 2 (N.M. 2006), available at http://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/
06%20Regular/firs/HB0531.pdf (noting, in the context of jurors with felony
convictions, that “[j]urors may be excluded for cause if the judge agrees the
juror cannot serve impartially”).
56. United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1997); see id. at 43–
45.
57. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.16(a) (West 2013) (giving, as second ground for a cause challenge, that “the juror has been convicted
of misdemeanor theft or a felony”); id. (“No juror shall be impaneled when it
appears that the juror is subject to the second, third or fourth grounds of challenge for cause set forth above, although both parties may consent.”).
58. In Iowa, for example, where the only statutory conviction-based exclusion is for cause, the court of appeals has held the statutory language to imply
“permissive or discretionary action.” State v. Shimko, 725 N.W.2d 659, No. 0517158, 2006 WL 3018467, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2006); see supra notes
53–54 and accompanying text; see also Shimko, 725 N.W.2d, 2006 WL
3018467, at *2 (“The test to be applied in ruling on challenges for cause is
‘whether the juror holds such a fixed opinion on the merits of the case that he
or she cannot judge impartially the guilt or innocence of the defendant.’” (citation omitted)).
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now requires that there be “[other] grounds” to justify the re59
moval of someone with a felony conviction.
Thus, again, jurisdictions differ on the question of whether
a judge should automatically grant a cause challenge where a
potential juror has a criminal conviction, or whether a conviction is insufficient to demonstrate that the juror is unfit.
D. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
The final way in which a criminal record can prompt a removal from the jury is through a peremptory challenge exercised by one of the attorneys. Peremptory challenges differ from
challenges for cause in two ways: first, they are finite in num60
61
ber, and second, ordinarily no reason need be given for them.
It is only if a Batson claim is made—if, in other words, the opposing party makes an allegation that the peremptory challenge was used to effect purposeful discrimination on the basis
62
of race, ethnicity or gender—that a justification need be given.
That justification needs to be “race- [or ethnicity-, or gender-]
63
neutral” but does not need to be persuasive, or even plausi64
ble.
When met with a Batson claim on the grounds of racial or
ethnic discrimination, prosecutors frequently offer as a justification the fact that a potential juror has a criminal record, or
65
has been charged with a crime. Indeed, as Melynda Price
found in her survey of capital cases drawn from the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeal, a “link to the criminal justice system
ranks second only to ambivalent views on the death penalty as

59. City of Mandan v. Baer, 578 N.W.2d 559, 563 (N.D. 1998) (indicating
that in 1993 North Dakota “eliminate[d] ‘conviction for a felony’ as a specifically enumerated challenge for cause”); id. (“A convicted felon may be excused
from the venire, but the removal must be based on grounds other than conviction of a felony.”).
60. See Andrew Weis, Peremptory Challenges: The Last Barrier to Jury
Service for People with Disabilities, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 41 (1997); supra
note 49 and accompanying text.
61. See Weis, supra note 60, at 5; supra note 49 and accompanying text.
62. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986); see Weis, supra note 60, at
10–11.
63. Id. at 11; see id. at 10.
64. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767–68 (1995) (per curiam).
65. See Roberts, Disparately Seeking Jurors, supra note 12, at 45.
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the most frequently cited reason for using peremptory chal66
lenges to remove African American jurors.”
Thus, in each of these four major ways, criminal convictions can lead to removal from jury service. The variation between states is striking, as is the cumulative picture of immense vulnerability to this form of civic exclusion.
II. THE HARMS
This Part addresses three of the primary harms created by
the regimes of exclusion laid out in Part I: racial disparity and
cover for purposeful discrimination; loss of experience; and tension with reintegrative goals.
A. RACIAL DISPARITY AND COVER FOR PURPOSEFUL
DISCRIMINATION
The exclusion of those with criminal records brings the risk
of exacerbating racial disparity within the jury system. Because
67
rates of criminalization vary according to race, jury exclusions
68
relying on criminal records have a disparate impact, thus offering an illustration of the notion that American criminal justice “systematically excludes racial minorities from its
decisionmaking processes while disproportionately imposing its
69
burdens on them.” The effect is dramatic. In 2003, Brian Kalt
estimated that exclusion on the basis of felony convictions reduced the representation of African American men on juries by
70
thirty percent. Kevin Johnson has pointed out that an analogous disparity exists in the exclusion of Latinas and Latinos

66. Melynda J. Price, Performing Discretion or Performing Discrimination: Race, Ritual, and Peremptory Challenges in Capital Jury Selection, 15
MICH. J. RACE & L. 57, 84–85, 90 (2009).
67. See J. McGregor Smyth, Jr., From Arrest to Reintegration: A Model for
Mitigating Collateral Consequences of Criminal Proceedings, CRIM. JUST., Fall
2009, at 42, 43 (“African Americans and Latinos face significantly greater likelihood of being arrested, convicted, and incarcerated than whites.”).
68. See Robert J. Smith & Bidish J. Sarma, How and Why Race Continues
to Influence the Administration of Criminal Justice in Louisiana, 72 LA. L.
REV. 361, 406 (2012) (“[S]kewed enforcement of criminal laws (for example,
disproportionate arrests for drug possession crime despite equal rates of drug
use) has the collateral consequence of excluding a disproportionate number of
black citizens from jury service.”).
69. Note, Judging the Prosecution: Why Abolishing Peremptory Challenges
Limits the Dangers of Prosecutorial Discretion, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2121, 2121
(2006).
70. Kalt, supra note 7, at 113.

Roberts_MLR

2013]

603

CASUAL OSTRACISM
71

from jury service because of felony convictions. Similarly, Alexandra Natapoff has pointed out that an analogous racial disparity exists in the distribution of misdemeanor convictions,
72
which some courts can also use to exclude potential jurors.
In addition to exacerbating racial disparity, these exclusions may increase the ease with which purposeful discrimination can be effected in jury selection. Prosecutors continue to
demonstrate a propensity to exercise peremptory challenges
73
against jurors of color, and when Batson claims from their adversaries require them to justify these peremptory challenges,
they often cite as a justification a connection between the chal74
lenged juror and the criminal justice system. Scholars and litigants have claimed that the disparate impact of these justifications is no coincidence, that a connection with the criminal
75
justice system is not race neutral, and that the asserted justifications are merely a cover for purposeful discrimination on
76
the basis of race or ethnicity. These claims have not pre71. See Kevin R. Johnson, Hernandez v. Texas: Legacies of Justice and
Injustice, 25 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 153, 158 (2005) (mentioning “disqualification of felons” as one of the mechanisms that bars “disproportionate numbers of Latina/os from serving on juries”).
72. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1313,
1372 (2012) [hereinafter Natapoff, Misdemeanors] (“[T]he petty offense machinery has become a way to formally label as ‘criminal’ thousands of vulnerable individuals of color without regard to evidence of their individual culpability.”); supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text.
73. See Hiroshi Fukurai & Edgar W. Butler, Sources of Racial Disenfranchisement in the Jury and Jury Selection System, 13 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 238,
269 (1994) (“An important observation is that prosecutors are more likely to
peremptorily challenge minorities than are defense attorneys.”).
74. See Roberts, Disparately Seeking Jurors, supra note 12, at 1375 (mentioning prosecutorial justifications for peremptory challenges grounded in jurors’ ties to criminal justice system).
75. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 130 (2010) (“A black
kid arrested twice for possession of marijuana may be no more of a repeat offender than a white frat boy who regularly smokes pot in his dorm room. But
because of his race and his confinement to a racially segregated ghetto, the
black kid has a criminal record, while the white frat boy, because of his race
and relative privilege, does not. Thus, when prosecutors throw the book at
black repeat offenders or when police stalk ex-offenders and subject them to
regular frisks and searches on the grounds that it makes sense to ‘watch criminals closely,’ they are often exacerbating racial disparities created by the discretionary decision to wage the War on Drugs almost exclusively in poor communities of color.”); Price, supra note 66, at 95 (“The removal of African
Americans for . . . familiarity with the criminal justice system . . . is, most arguably, not race neutral.”).
76. See Roberts, Disparately Seeking Jurors, supra note 12, at 1375–76
(describing disparate impact arguments against facially “race-neutral” justifications for juror strikes).
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77

vailed : courts continue to find that the reason for a peremptory challenge can be “race-neutral” in the sense required by Bat78
son even if it has a disparate impact, and that purposeful dis79
crimination cannot be established on this ground alone. Even
while legal claims fail, scholarly calls persist for judges to police
more carefully the risk that this type of justification masks
80
purposeful discrimination.
The harms brought about by racial disparity the risk of
purposeful racial discrimination affect many groups. Those who
have historically been disenfranchised may be kept once again
81
from civic participation. Those whose fates are determined by
the jury may see their chances of a fair trial decrease since diverse juries outperform all-white juries in a number of key are82
as. Effects in this area can spiral, since some studies have
shown that the whiter the jury, the more likely it is to convict
83
people of color; those convicted may in turn be precluded from
84
future jury service, and so on.
77. See id. at 1363, 1374–75 (demonstrating that in published federal cases the prosecutorial justifications most commonly attacked as having a racially
or ethnically disparate impact stemming from purposeful discrimination were
those relating to the criminal justice system and that those claims of discrimination, when made on behalf of jurors of color, all ultimately failed).
78. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 362 (1991).
79. Id. at 362–63.
80. See, e.g., Roberts, Disparately Seeking Jurors, supra note 12, at 1417
(calling for courts and critics to heed the risks of disparities in applying Batson).
81. See Rubio v. Super. Ct., 593 P.2d 595, 605 n.11 (Cal. 1979) (en banc)
(Tobriner, J., dissenting) (“Ironically, the political and social value of governmental participation through jury service may be especially significant to
groups historically disenfranchised and victimized by public and private discrimination . . . .”).
82. See Leipold, supra note 18, at 1007 (“Even in cases in which the only
questions were factual, more diverse juries would still enliven the debate,
bring different life experiences to the table, and squelch the airing of stereotypes that otherwise could harm the defendant.”); Samuel R. Sommers, On
Racial Diversity and Group Decision-Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of
Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 597, 608 (2006) (discussing a study suggesting that diverse groups
deliberate longer, make fewer factual errors, are more likely to correct inaccuracies, and are more open-minded than all-white groups).
83. Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom,
7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 201, 208 (2001).
84. See Smith & Sarma, supra note 68, at 363 (pointing out that factors
such as discriminatory jury challenges cause “negative feedback loops that inhibit the ability of minority group members to participate meaningfully in the
justice system and exact political change”).
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Racially disparate exclusions threaten not only individuals
and groups, but also the reputation of the jury. As Kevin Johnson puts it, racially skewed juries “undermine the perceived
impartiality of the justice system and, at the most fundamental
85
level, the rule of law.” Thus, the racial inequities brought
about by these exclusions jeopardize key values within the jury
system: accuracy, impartiality, jury reputation, and the rule of
law. As will be seen below, the very same values are cited as
justifications for these exclusions, and thus are undermined
even as they are purportedly being championed.
B. LOSS OF EXPERIENCE
To exclude from jury service those with criminal convictions is to remove a certain type of experience from the jury;
this should not be done lightly. Experience is a key part of the
jury’s arsenal: jury instructions tell jurors to bring their experi86
ence to the task, thus appearing to acknowledge the fact that
87
experience shapes interpretation of facts. Yet it is diversity of
experience that shapes interpretation of facts in a way most
consonant with our ideals of the jury: the jury’s ability to offer a
“collective wisdom and body of experience” is part of what justi88
fies its existence. Thus, the exclusion of those who have direct
experience of the criminal justice system risks creating bias
89
even while being sought in the name of bias-removal. One
state judge declared that “[w]hen any segment of the community . . . is excluded as a matter of law from jury service based on
stereotypes and innuendo, the representativeness of the jury is
reduced and the jury loses one of a variety of perspectives on
85. Johnson, supra note 71, at 158.
86. Maureen A. Howard, Taking the High Road: Why Prosecutors Should
Voluntarily Waive Peremptory Challenges, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369, 406
(2010); see People v. Wilson, 187 P.3d 1041, 1082 (Cal. 2008) (“[W]e expect jurors to use their own life experiences when evaluating the evidence.”).
87. See Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 400 (1996) (referencing cognitive theory to support claim that “[o]ne’s interpretation of the facts is
influenced by one’s background and experience”); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1261, 1264 (2000) (“An individual’s experiences influence her capacity to interpret and evaluate facts and
then to make judgments about justice.”).
88. Grigsby v. Mabry, 483 F. Supp. 1372, 1377–78 n.6 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
89. See State v. Haynes, 514 So. 2d 1206, 1211 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (describing statutory exclusion on the basis of felony conviction as “a reasonable
qualification to insure lack of partiality, bias or prejudice in the trial of a criminal case”).
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90

human events.” She was discussing a proposal that law en91
forcement officers be automatically excluded, but her critiques
of such a proposal—the lack of evidence of bias, and the narrowing of the jury’s experience—also apply to the exclusion of
those with criminal convictions.
The judging of criminal cases may suffer from the absence
of those with direct experience of the criminal justice system,
since its workings are often not intuitive. Jurors are instructed
92
to bring their “common sense” to their task, but laypersons’
common sense is often inadequate in the criminal justice are93
na. If a layperson tries to imagine him- or herself in a suspect’s position, for example, it might defy common sense to im94
agine that a suspect would “confess” in the absence of guilt.
Yet interrogation techniques are often designed to defy common
sense, by making it appear as if giving a statement would be in
95
the suspect’s best interest. Unique pressures act upon those
caught up in the criminal justice system—not only to give a
90. State v. Louis, 457 N.W.2d 484, 491 (Wis. 1990) (Abrahamson, J., concurring); id. at 482 (majority opinion) (finding the assumption that law enforcement officials are implicitly biased against defendants “unfounded”).
91. Id. at 491 (Abrahamson, J., concurring). For another example of law
enforcement officers escaping a presumption that they harbor a bias, see State
v. Sharrow, 949 A.2d 428, 436 (Vt. 2008) (“[I]nferring bias to a seasoned policeacademy teacher on the basis of this status alone would effectively disqualify
him from jury service for any case involving police-officer witnesses. It is simply not necessary to do so in order to preserve the right to trial by impartial jury where a defendant has an opportunity show actual bias.”).
92. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (“The purpose of a
jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power—to make available the
commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against the overzealous
or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps
overconditioned or biased response of a judge.”); Howard, supra note 86, at 406
(“[J]urors are instructed by the judge to draw on their life experiences and
common sense in deciding the case.”).
93. See Lisa Dufraimont, Regulating Unreliable Evidence: Can Evidence
Rules Guide Juries and Prevent Wrongful Convictions?, 33 QUEEN’S L.J. 261,
265 (“Because jurors are untrained and generally unfamiliar with the justice
system, they often lack the experience and knowledge required to evaluate the
prosecution’s evidence.”).
94. Nadia Soree, When the Innocent Speak: False Confessions, Constitutional Safeguards, and the Role of Expert Testimony, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 191,
196 (2005) (“[C]ommon sense tells us that innocent suspects do not confess to
crimes they have not committed.”).
95. See Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979, 990 (1997)
(“Once a suspect fully appreciates his dismal situation, the investigator can
influence him to admit guilt if he is led to believe that making an admission
will improve his position.”).
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“confession,” but also to take a plea, and to cooperate.
Those who have been through the criminal justice system as
defendants may be able to understand those pressures in a way
inaccessible to others. In addition, the common sense of the uninitiated may suggest that those sworn to uphold the law—
prosecutors and police—can be relied upon to act with integrity,
and indeed laypersons generally place tremendous confidence
99
in the integrity of prosecutors and police. Research into prosecutorial and police misconduct indicates that such confidence is
100
often misplaced.
The growing body of data on wrongful convictions, particularly with respect to three of the leading characteristics of
wrongful convictions cases, heightens the importance of skepticism regarding the easy exclusion of those with direct experience of the criminal justice system. The National Registry of
101
Exonerations has documented 1215 exonerations, and this
figure is likely to be only a tiny fraction of the cases where ex96. See The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://
www.innocenceproject.org/understand/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2013) (including
“False Confessions / Admissions” as one of the four leading causes of wrongful
convictions in the first 225 DNA exonerations).
97. The uninitiated may assume, in assessing defendant testimony, that a
defendant would not have garnered a prior conviction, by plea or after a trial,
if he or she were not morally culpable, as well as indubitably guilty. These assumptions can be misguided. 9.6% of those in the national exoneration registry pled guilty. Exoneration Detail List, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS,
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
98. See The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, supra note 96 (identifying “informants” as one of the four leading causes of wrongful convictions). Informants, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/
Snitches-Informants.php (Nov. 4, 2013) (pointing out that “[i]n more than 15%
of wrongful conviction cases overturned through DNA testing, an informant
testified against the defendant at the original trial”).
99. See Nancy Gertner, Is the Jury Worth Saving?, 75 B.U. L. REV. 923,
931 (1995) (reviewing STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE
AMERICAN COURTROOM (1994)) (“The public, with few exceptions, has enormous faith in the skill and integrity of police and prosecutors.”).
100. See Michelle Alexander, Op-Ed., Why Police Lie Under Oath, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/opinion/sunday/why
-police-officers-lie-under-oath.html (pointing out the incentives for police officers to testify falsely, and claiming that “[i]n this era of mass incarceration, the
police shouldn’t be trusted any more than any other witness, perhaps less so”);
Michael L. Volkov & Allyson Miller, Prosecutorial Misconduct: An Increasing
Problem or Overblown Hysteria?, PROSECUTION NOTES (Ctr. on the Admin. of
Criminal Law, New York, N.Y.), 2010, at 7 (“[R]ecent studies show that prosecutorial misconduct is a systemic reality, at least at the state and local levels
of the criminal justice system.”).
101. Exoneration Detail List, supra note 97.
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102

oneration is merited. The hundreds of jury trials within this
group of cases indicate that juries have been making mis103
takes. More specifically, three of the most common characteristics of wrongful conviction cases correlate with areas where
104
laypersons’ common sense might be inadequate. False confessions, for example, are a leading characteristic of wrongful con105
viction cases; their falsity may be hard to detect if one cannot
imagine why someone would admit to something that never oc106
curred, and indeed jurors do fail to understand the phenome107
non of false confessions. Informant testimony is another lead108
ing characteristic of wrongful conviction cases. One may fully
credit it if one is unaware of the kinds of pressures that might
102. See SAMUEL R. GROSS & MICHAEL SHAFFER, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXEXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989–2012, at 3 (2012)
(“The most important conclusion of this Report is that there are far more false
convictions than exonerations. That should come as no surprise. The essential
fact about false convictions is that they are generally invisible: if we could spot
them, they’d never happen in the first place. Why would anyone suppose that
the small number of miscarriages of justice that we learn about years later—
like the handful of fossils of early hominids that we have discovered—is anything more than an insignificant fraction of the total?”).
103. Only 118 of the 1238 cases listed in the National Registry of Exonerations were resolved by guilty plea. Exoneration Detail List, supra note 97.
104. See Keith A. Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate Process, 93
MARQ. L. REV. 591, 624 (2009) (explaining that laypersons’ common sense can
be unreliable in the areas of eyewitness evidence, false confessions, informant
testimony, and forensic science evidence).
105. False Confessions, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject
.org/understand/False-Confessions.php (last visited Nov. 4, 2013) (“In about
25% of DNA exoneration cases, innocent defendants made incriminating
statements, delivered outright confessions or pled guilty.”).
106. See Findley, supra note 104, at 628 (“[C]ommon sense about false confessions can be quite wrong. Simply put, it is counterintuitive to believe that a
person would confess to a crime, especially a serious crime, that she did not
commit.”).
107. See id. (“[T]he empirical evidence is there: people do confess falsely
and to the most heinous of crimes. Research confirms that jurors do not understand this reality about confessions.”); Jacqueline McMurtrie, The Role of
the Social Sciences in Preventing Wrongful Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1271, 1280 (2005) (“[A] confession is given tremendous weight by a jury, resulting in defendants being convicted on the basis of a confession even in the
absence of evidence corroborating the confession.”).
108. Informant testimony is “the leading cause of wrongful convictions in
capital cases.” CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, THE SNITCH SYSTEM (2004–
05), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/SnitchSystemBooklet
.pdf (describing fifty-one wrongful convictions that involved perjured informant testimony that the jurors credited); ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING:
CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 3 (2009)
[hereinafter NATAPOFF, SNITCHING] (stating that the use of criminal informants is “clandestine and unregulated,” and invites inaccuracy).
ONERATIONS,
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109

impair its accuracy, and indeed jurors typically credit in110
formant testimony. Government misconduct, a third leading
111
characteristic of wrongful conviction cases, might go undetected if one has never had anything but positive experiences at
the hands of law enforcement.
To explore the benefits of lay participation by those who
know something of the pressures and fractures of the criminal
justice system is not to urge that jurors with convictions act as
experts. It is, rather, to agree with Akhil Reed Amar that “a ju112
ror should have an open mind but not an empty mind.” In
other contexts, policymakers have started to realize that fair
113
jurors do not need to be ignorant of the system. In New York,
for example, the former Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals,
Judith Kaye, proudly announced the expansion of jury service
109. See Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH.
U. L. REV. 815, 854 (2007) (“Prosecutors . . . commonly use the testimony of
some offenders as a means to facilitate prosecution of others, granting the testifying criminal reduced punishment (by way of sentencing departures for
‘substantial assistance’ and the like) or no punishment (by way of a ‘cooperation agreement’ or a grant of witness immunity) as an inducement.”).
110. See NATAPOFF, SNITCHING, supra note 108, at 77 (“[N]umerous exonerations reveal just how often juries believe lying criminal informants, even
when juries know that the informant is being compensated and has the incentive to lie.”).
111. See The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, supra note 96 (listing “government misconduct” as one of the seven most common causes of wrongful
convictions); Government Misconduct, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www
.innocenceproject.org/understand/Government-Misconduct.php (last visited
Nov. 4, 2013) (“The cases of wrongful convictions uncovered by DNA testing
are filled with evidence of negligence, fraud or misconduct by prosecutors or
police departments.”).
112. Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1180, 1182 (1995); id. at 1182 (“The jury—and not just
the venire—should be as cross-sectional of the entire community of the whole
people as possible.”); see also Grigsby v. Mabry, 483 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 n.7
(E.D. Ark. 1980) (“If all members of a religious group which believed in polygamy were excluded for cause in a bigamy trial simply because they were members of that religion, this would deprive the defendant of a ‘representative’ jury.”); Smith & Sarma, supra note 68, at 405 (“[P]rosecutors successfully
eliminate many people of color through discriminatory jury selection even
though many live in the areas where the crimes are committed, understand
the police conduct in those areas, and live with the situational pressures and
constraints that define such locations.”).
113. See Michael B. Mushlin, Bound and Gagged: The Peculiar Predicament of Professional Jurors, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 239, 251 n.54 (2007) (citing a 2001 report on the New York changes stating that “members of the legal
profession who are no longer exempt from service find jury service particularly
valuable, as it offers a view of the legal system from a juror’s seat and provides
new perspective”).
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eligibility to include lawyers and others, and emphasized an effort to accumulate diverse experience:
We do not require jurors to check their life experiences at the courtroom door, nor could we. In fact, one of the goals of New York’s jury
reform was to eliminate all automatic exemptions from service, bringing to the jury room a wide array of individuals with specialized
114
knowledge and training.

This reform did not address the continuing exclusion of those
115
with felony records. Indeed, New York’s juror orientation video ignores the very existence of this group of people in announcing that “[t]oday our jury pools represent the entire community,
116
in all its diversity.” True reform will not occur until the exclusion of those with criminal convictions, and the assumptions
on which that exclusion is based, are acknowledged, and addressed.
C. TENSION WITH REINTEGRATIVE GOALS
These exclusions are also in tension with ideals of reentry,
which is “the process by which individuals return to communi117
ties from prison or jail custody,” and reintegration, which can
118
be thought of as “the ultimate goal.” The tension lies in both
the removal of an opportunity for civic inclusion and the message about the unfitness of those with criminal convictions that
119
is sent both to those excluded and to those included.
114. People v. Arnold, 753 N.E. 846, 854 (N.Y. 2001) (footnote omitted).
115. Paula Z. Segal, A More Inclusive Democracy: Challenging Felon Jury
Exclusion in New York, 13 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 313, 332 (2010) (“Despite the recognized need to expand the jury pool in New York, felon jury inclusion was
conspicuously absent from Justice Kaye’s admirable reforms.”).
116. See Videotape: Your Turn (Ted Steed Productions, Inc. 1997), available at http://nyjuror.gov/JO_VideoScripts.shtml (Petit Jury Orientation).
117. ANTHONY C. THOMPSON, RELEASING PRISONERS, REDEEMING COMMUNITIES: REENTRY, RACE, AND POLITICS 1 (2008).
118. Michael Pinard, Broadening the Holistic Mindset: Incorporating Collateral Consequences and Reentry into Criminal Defense Lawyering, 31
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1067, 1084 n.71 (2004) (“The terms ‘reentry’ and ‘reintegration’ tend to be used interchangeably in this context. However, some have
observed these to be distinct concepts. For instance, one commentator observes
that reentry is the process by which an ex-offender leaves confinement and
returns to his or her community, while reintegration is the ultimate goal.” (citing Jeremy Travis, Address at the University of Maryland School of Law
(Sept. 8, 2003))).
119. See Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
153, 160 (1999) (“Many collateral consequences, therefore, seem to ‘fit more
appropriately with the discarded idea that an offender should be eliminated or
banished from society.’ That goal, however, makes reintegration and member-
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Reentry has gained recent prominence as a focus in crimi120
nal justice policy. One of the types of activity that has been
found to aid the possibility of reentry is civic participation.
Some judges, legislators, and commentators have recognized
the potential of voting, for example, to aid the reintegration of
121
those with felony convictions. The potential seems stronger
with jury service, which, unlike voting, requires serious and ex122
tended “civic interchange,” and which increases the likelihood
123
of participation in future forms of civic engagement. Thus,
one judge has applied the voting precedent to the jury context,
124
urging that the same potential be recognized. Other judges
have noted the tension between jury exclusion and reintegraship in society elusive.” (quoting Note, Civil Disabilities of Felons, 53 VA. L.
REV. 403, 423 (1967))).
120. See Pinard, supra note 118, at 1083–84 (“Very recently, advocates,
scholars, social scientists, policy analysts, politicians, media, and numerous
grassroots organizations have begun to focus on various issues relating to exoffender reentry.”); id. at 1085–87 (giving examples of federal and state exoffender reentry initiatives).
121. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 79 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (denying the right to vote “is a hindrance to the efforts of society to
rehabilitate former felons and convert them into law-abiding and productive
citizens” (quoting Memorandum of the Secretary of State of California in Opposition to Certiorari, Class of Cnty. Clerks & Registrars v. Ramirez, 418 U.S.
904 (1974) (No. 72-324))); DEMOS, RESTORING VOTING RIGHTS TO CITIZENS
WITH FELONY CONVICTIONS (2003–04) (“If we want former felons to become
good citizens, we must give them rights as well as responsibilities, and there is
no greater responsibility than voting.” (quoting U.S. Rep. John Conyers, Jr.));
Op-Ed., Disenfranchised Felons, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2012, http://www
.nytimes.com/2012/07/16/opinion/disenfranchised-felons.html (“Former offenders who are allowed to vote are less likely to return to prison and more likely
to become reintegrated into their communities.”).
122. Kalt, supra note 7, at 128; see Demleitner, supra note 119, at 161
(pointing out that a rationale for restrictions that separates those with criminal convictions from others leads “to societal fragmentation and thwarts possible rehabilitation”); Judge Paul J. Garotto, Speech Before the Omaha Bar
Association (Sept. 24, 1964), in Jury Service—A Citizen’s Duty, 13 NEB. ST. B.
J. 111, 112 (1964) (“Jury service is a duty that most citizens apparently seek to
avoid, or wish they could. It is the kind of basic common experience that all
citizens, bar none, should have at least once. . . . [S]itting through a trial as a
member of the jury, and then seeking with the other eleven jurors to reach a
just and fair and unanimous verdict is a very enlightening and enriching experience.” (emphasis added)); id. at 113 (“What else do we have that can teach,
exercise, and strengthen so much political, social, moral and religious virtue
as does serving on a jury?”).
123. See Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, The Verdict on Juries, 91 JUDICATURE 226, 226–27, 230 (2008) (“[J]ury service can increase other forms of civic
participation such as voting.”).
124. See Rubio v. Super. Ct., 593 P.2d 595, 604–05 (Cal. 1979) (en banc)
(Tobriner, J., dissenting).
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125

tion. Most notably, a Colorado appeals court found that because of the reintegrative benefits of jury service, the legislature acted rationally in lifting the automatic exclusion of those
with felony convictions, and that the resulting statute:
serves the legitimate government objective of providing convicted felons with the opportunity to participate in the American judicial process once their sentences have been served. Thus, [the Colorado statute] is rationally related to the legitimate legislative purpose of
rehabilitating convicted felons and reintegrating them into society
126
once their punishment is complete.

In addition to removing the opportunity to participate in an inclusionary activity, automatic exclusions have expressive pow127
er. They send to convicted individuals a message of “you do
128
not belong”—and in many instances “you will never belong” —
that is at odds with the demand that one “reenter.” The labeling and stigmatizing involved in this kind of exclusion inter129
feres with efforts at reentry. In addition, it sends a message
to the broader community that reinforces, instead of challenging, perceptions of those with convictions as “other,” and indeed
as a dangerous other. As Dorothy Roberts has written, “[b]y
denying felons the opportunity to participate in legal processes
such as voting, jury service, and holding public office . . . mass
incarceration reinforces internal social norms that treat these
processes as illegitimate as well as the external perception of
125. See, e.g., Froede v. Holland Ladder & Mfg. Co., 523 N.W.2d 849, 852
(Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (drawing connection between the lifting of automatic
bans and reintegration, at least in the context of civil jury service).
126. People v. Ellis, 148 P. 3d 205, 211 (Colo. App. 2006), cert. denied, 2006
WL 3393584 (Colo. 2006) (affirming guilty verdict reached by a jury containing
a juror with a felony conviction, in relation to whom the trial judge had rejected a cause challenge).
127. See Ekow N. Yankah, Good Guys and Bad Guys: Punishing Character,
Equality and the Irrelevance of Moral Character to Criminal Punishment, 25
CARDOZO L. REV. 1019, 1032–33 (2004) (“These punishments point to one way
of imagining the criminal offender. Not only does the criminal offender betray
her immoral character but that character is permanent. The criminal’s bad
character places her into an inferior class of citizens. The offender is to be
permanently locked away if possible. Her vote is taken away permanently, her
claim to political equality denied. The criminal is barred from sitting on a jury,
participating in government, sharing in social and welfare rights and taking
full part in her economic wellbeing. A class system based on permanent moral
inferiority makes the criminal a permanent lesser citizen.”).
128. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of lifetime bans and other repercussions faced by those with convictions.
129. See Demleitner, supra note 119, at 161 (“If [collateral consequences]
are not discontinued within a reasonable period of time, they will interfere
with the ex-offender’s rehabilitative efforts by continuing to stigmatize and
label him.”).
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these communities as outside the national polity.” Thus, legislation in this area plays a part in confirming anti131
reintegrative stereotypes rather than seizing the opportunity
132
to shift prejudices by showing people in a new role : that of
civic participant.
The assumption conveyed by these exclusions—that those
with a criminal record are civically unfit—may help reveal why
concrete commitments to reentry goals have often appeared
133
halting. If reentry goals remain desirable, then these exclu134
sions, and other aspects of the criminal justice system, may
135
have to be rethought. George Fletcher has explored this notion in the context of voting, arguing that “[o]nce we
acknowledge the necessity of reintegration, we could hardly
136
maintain the practice of disenfranchising felons.” He held
130. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration
in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1293 (2004) [hereinafter Roberts, Cost of Mass Incarceration].
131. See Sharon Dolovich, Exclusion and Control in the Carceral State, 16
BERK. J. CRIM. L. 259, 265–67 (2011) [hereinafter Dolovich, Exclusion and
Control] (pointing out the dehumanization of those whom the state incarcerates, and arguing that “a political strategy emphasizing the financial costs of
incarceration is bound to fail unless it also generates an ideological reorientation towards recognizing the people the state incarcerates as fellow human beings and fellow citizens, entitled to respect and consideration as such”).
132. See CLAUDE M. STEELE, WHISTLING VIVALDI: AND OTHER CLUES TO
HOW STEREOTYPES AFFECT US 6–7 (2011).
133. See David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration?, 9 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 27, 32 (2011) (“Funding for [reentry and reintegration] programs remains manifestly insufficient, so much so that Loïc Wacquant has
dismissed reentry as ‘myth and ceremony.’” (quoting Loïc Wacquant, Prisoner
Reentry as Myth and Ceremony, 34 DIALECT. ANTHROPOL. 605 (2010))); Love,
supra note 19 (“Social liberals and fiscal conservatives alike pay lip service to
the supposed American ideal of second chances. But our language, like our
law, points in the opposite direction.”). The funding appropriated for reentry
programs pursuant to the Second Chance Act, which was signed into law by
George W. Bush in 2007, “has been far less than is needed to create meaningful possibilities for successful reintegration.” Dolovich, Exclusion and Control,
supra note 131, at 337 n.251.
134. See George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the Racial Uses of Infamia, 46 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1895, 1907 (1999).
135. Note that critics such as Michelle Alexander would require much more
in order to regard the use of the phrase “reentry” as making any sense. See
Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 9 (2011) (alluding to the absurdity of the concept of people “re-entering” a society “that
never seemed to have much use for them in the first place”).
136. Fletcher, supra note 134, at 1907 (“The challenge of recognizing that
we implicitly endorse a caste system in criminal law is to reformulate our theories of punishment. The emphasis on reintegration into society should come
front and center. Once we acknowledge the necessity of reintegration, we could
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back from extending his critique to exclusions of those with felony convictions from jury service—calling such exclusion “al137
most reasonable” —and yet the same critique applies.
III. THE JUSTIFICATIONS
In Part III, this Article turns from the harms of jury exclusion, laid out in Part II, to their justifications. This Part describes and critiques four of the most commonly asserted justi138
fications : public perception, juror character, the “purity” of
the jury, and embitterment against the system.
A. PUBLIC PERCEPTION
One common justification for these exclusions is that the
reputation of the jury would be compromised by the inclusion of
those with criminal—especially felony—convictions. Judges endorse the rationale that exclusion of those with felony convictions is related to efforts to achieve a “reputable and reliable
139
jury . . . whose judgment society can respect,” and invoke the
hardly maintain the practice of disenfranchising felons. On the contrary, we
should be encouraging inmates to begin thinking of themselves as useful
members of society with all the attendant responsibilities. Having the responsibility to vote should be the minimum condition for inculcating the sense that
felons too are citizens.”).
137. Id. at 1906.
138. Note that courts are often reluctant to offer any justifications. See,
e.g., State v. Folkerts, 629 P.2d 173, 177 (Kan. 1981) (stating that those with a
felony conviction would be unfit “for obvious reasons”). This Article adopts the
position that assumptions upon which components of the criminal justice system rest should be spelled out, and that only those that are convincing should
be adopted.
139. United States v. Best, 214 F. Supp. 2d 897, 905 (N.D. Ind. 2002) (holding that the rationale especially applies to the bar on jury service by convicted
felons); see United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Randolph, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“If [a juror with a felony
conviction is summoned for jury duty and] is discovered before trial, presumably he is excluded without further ado . . . not because of an inference, arising
out of the identities of the parties and other circumstances of a particular case,
that he will be biased for one side or against the other, but rather because
Congress determined that he ought not sit on any jury, determine the fate of
any party, under any circumstances, in any case. That judgment reflects concern about maintaining the integrity of the jury . . . and with it, public confidence in verdicts. As Justice Kennedy recently put it, ‘the purpose of the jury
system is to impress upon the criminal defendant and the community as a
whole that a verdict of acquittal is given in accordance with the law by persons
who are fair.’ Congress, I believe, adopted what is no doubt the traditional
view—reflected elsewhere in our law—that felons are generally less trustworthy and responsible than others, and that they just cannot be counted on to be
‘fair.’” (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 413 (1991))).
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importance of “maintaining the integrity of the jury . . . and
140
with it, public confidence in verdicts.”
As with the other primary justifications, no empirical support is given for the idea that the public would realize, care
about, or despair at the presence of someone with a criminal
conviction on the jury. Word has not yet arrived, for example, of
a jury crisis in Colorado and Maine, the two states that have no
141
conviction-based exclusions from jury service. Yet it may be
that these exclusions provide their own rationale, since the easiest way to ensure that those with felony convictions are seen
as inappropriate civic participants is to enforce and endorse
their exclusion. Those bringing about these exclusions, in other
words, should consider the power of the law either to reinforce
or to challenge stereotypes.
The public perception rationale not only lacks support, but
also runs up against three countervailing public perception
concerns. First, any exclusion that removes a sector of the
community risks damaging public perception, since, as the Supreme Court stated in Taylor v. Louisiana, community participation is “critical to public confidence in the fairness of the
142
criminal justice system.”
Even as courts and legislatures
143
trumpet “integrity,” in the sense of “probity,” these exclusions
jeopardize the value of “integrity,” in the sense of “wholeness.”
Perhaps most damaging to public perception of community representation on juries has been the history of racial disparity
144
and discrimination in jury selection. As stated above, these
145
exclusions risk exacerbating both.
A second countervailing concern is that in other spheres of
decisionmaking about alleged law-breakers, participation as
judges by those who have been through the system is lauded
rather than shunned. Youth courts, for example, in which those
140. Boney, 977 F.2d at 642; see also Hoffman v. State, 922 S.W.2d 663, 667
(Tex. App. 1996) (mentioning “the wish of the state of Texas to preserve the
integrity of its jury system by precluding convicted felons from sitting on juries”).
141. See supra Part I.B.
142. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
143. Boney, 977 F.2d at 642; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 561.026 cmt. to 1973
proposed code (2012) (“Many states permit persons with felony records to
serve on juries. However, the Committee decided to exclude all convicted felons from jury service (unless pardoned) in order to help maintain the integrity
of the jury system.”).
144. See Leipold, supra note 18, at 986 (noting harm to “public perception
of trial fairness” when lawyers remove all African American jurors).
145. See supra Part II.A.
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who have been held accountable for adjudicated transgressions
return to the system in order to determine the fate of someone
146
in their former position, have been widely adopted. Admittedly, the fact that an activity engaged in by young people receives
acclaim does not guarantee the same for an adult analog, but
the success of this model, under which experience operates as a
boon rather than a bar, undermines the assumption that those
who have been found guilty are destroyed as fair
decisionmakers.
A final countervailing concern relates to the limited conception of the “public” that this reliance on “public perception”
seems to adopt. Those with criminal convictions—and those
who care about their fate—are members of the public. Indeed,
they are a significant portion of the public: in America, one in
147
four adults has a criminal record. Thus, if courts and legislatures care about “public confidence” in verdicts, they must care
not only about possible concerns relating to inclusion on juries,
but also possible concerns relating to exclusion. Exclusionary
148
policies risk creating a sense of alienation from the law. Policymakers have started to address that sort of risk, through
149
programs such as community policing, and community prose150
cution. They must also address it as they evaluate policies of
151
jury exclusion.
146. See THE URBAN INSTITUTE, THE IMPACT OF TEEN COURT ON YOUNG
OFFENDERS 2 (2002), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410457
.pdf (describing youth courts as “very popular,” and estimating their number
at more than 800).
147. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL HISTORY
INFORMATION SYSTEMS 15 (2008), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
bjs/grants/228661.pdf.
148. See Johnson, supra note 71, at 193 (“Attention should be given to
whether barring felons from jury service continues to make sense in light of
what we suspect about unequal operation of the modern criminal justice system. The racially skewed impacts of the criminal justice system have ripple
effects on jury service and tends to diminish Latina/o representation on civil
and criminal juries, thus undermining the legitimacy of the judicial system in
the eyes of the Latina/o community.”).
149. Community policing emphasizes partnership with the community, in
order to achieve goals such as “crime prevention [and] order maintenance.”
Matthew J. Parlow, The Great Recession and Its Implications for Community
Policing, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1193, 1197 (2012).
150. Community prosecution expands the goals of community policing into
the prosecution context, emphasizing the importance of “increased community
input.” Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CALIF. L.
REV. 323, 368 (2004).
151. See Leipold, supra note 18, at 1007 (“The proper working of the criminal process depends on broad societal support for its goals and methods; these
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B. JUROR CHARACTER
Exclusions of those with criminal convictions are often justified on the basis that certain character flaws are revealed by
152
a criminal conviction and are inconsistent with jury service.
Indeed, one of the purported benefits of a statutory system of
exclusions was that it marked a move away from the earlier
method of discretionary “good character” determinations by ju153
ry commissioners and toward objectivity : the statutory system held out the promise of a clear and objective divide between those who had convictions and were therefore unfit and
those who had none and were therefore fit.
Thus, on the basis of criminal convictions, courts make a
variety of assumptions about the nature of potential jurors’
character and their resultant unfitness. One character trait
that is commonly said to be missing in those with felony convictions, and is therefore used to justify jury exclusion, is “probi154
ty.” In addition, according to one court, those with felony concan be best understood by those who have listened, deliberated, and pronounced a verdict on a fellow citizen.”); Tom Tyler & Jonathan Jackson, Future Challenges in the Study of Legitimacy and Criminal Justice 17 (Yale Law
Sch., Public Law Working Paper No. 264, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2141322 (noting the great importance of “moral alignment—the belief that the police, the courts and the law enforce shared community values
that reflect the person’s sense of what is right”).
152. See, e.g., New Mexico Fiscal Impact Report, H.B. 0531, available at
http://nmlegis.gov/Sessions/06%20Regular/firs/HB0531.pdf (2006) (“[The Office
of the Attorney General] asserts that restricting felons from juries would assist in ensuring that juries consist of law-abiding citizens of approved integrity, good character, and sound judgment who are most likely to perform their
jury service with the proper respect for the law.”).
153. See Anderson v. State, 542 So. 2d 292, 302 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (“‘It
is obvious that the [relevant federal statutes] seek to limit disqualification to a
few objective factors that most would agree are disabling. The effect should be
to eliminate subjectivity in the selection process and increase the representativeness of the panel.’” (quoting HALE STARR & MARK MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION 35 (1985))).
154. See United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123, 1127 (5th Cir. 1993) (excluding those with felony convictions is rationally related to the legitimate interest
in protecting the probity of juries); United States v. Foxworth, 599 F.2d 1, 4
(1st Cir. 1979) (the disqualification laid out by the federal statute “is intended
to assure the ‘probity’ of the jury” (quoting H.R. REP. No.90-1076, at 1796));
State v. Madoil, 12 Fla. 151, 163 (1867) (noting that if a juror had been convicted of an infamous crime, it would be the duty of the appellate court to
award a new trial, “for juries must be ‘probi et legales homines’”); H. R. REP.
No. 90-1076, at 1796 (“The bill . . . contains some guarantee of ‘probity’ at least
to the extent that persons are disqualified who have charges pending against
them for, or have been convicted of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year.”).
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victions “are generally less trustworthy and responsible than
155
others,” and cannot be counted on to be “fair.” Some courts
center their concern on moral character, as in Texas, where
there is said to be a “great interest in protecting against the
“pollution of [the state’s] jury system” by excluding from jury
service those “persons whose moral status has been judicially
156
established as criminal.”
In the criminal justice system as currently configured, this
criterion fails to justify automatic exclusion: it fails with sufficient accuracy to sort those who have violated the law from
those who have not, and it fails to supply an adequate proxy for
a character unfit for jury service.
First, the label of “criminal conviction” fails with sufficient
accuracy to sort those who have violated the law from those
157
who have not. The increasingly prominent phenomenon of the
158
wrongful conviction provides one obvious illustration.
The
risk of wrongful convictions may be particularly high with alleged misdemeanors, since the means of determining guilt are
159
particularly blunt, or nonexistent, in those cases. Yet common to both felony and misdemeanor charges is the overwhelm160
ing pressure to take a plea, and the limited judicial oversight
155. United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Randolph,
J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); see United States v. Evans, 192
F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that “grand theft” is a “serious crime,”
which could have provoked a peremptory challenge “based on concerns about
[the previously convicted juror’s] truthfulness, her commitment to following
the law or her attitude towards the criminal justice system”); State v. Prince,
250 P.3d 1145, 1159 (Ariz. 2011) (en banc) (“Section 21–201 [disqualifying
those with felony convictions] sets forth general qualifications for jury service
and reflects the policy that jurors should be ‘citizens who uphold and obey the
law.’” (quoting State v. Bojorquez, 535 P.2d 6, 12 (Ariz. 1975))).
156. Amaya v. State, 220 S.W. 98, 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1920).
157. See Symposium, Preliminary Report on Race and Washington’s Criminal Justice System, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 623, 637 (2012) (“Conviction rates
are not a valid proxy for commission rates.”); cf. Bojorquez, 535 P.2d at 12
(“Requiring jurors to be electors attempts to insure that citizens who uphold
and obey the law will be selected as jurors to discharge the responsibility of
jury service.”).
158. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
MICH. L. REV. 505, 570 (2001) [hereinafter Stuntz, Pathological Politics]
(“[T]he criminal process as it is currently constructed tends to narrow the gap
between the odds of convicting the guilty and the odds of convicting the innocent.”).
159. Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 72, at 1370 (“[T]he misdemeanor
process widely confers criminal records . . . on potentially innocent people
without checking whether they are actually guilty or not.”).
160. See Cahill, supra note 109, at 853 (“Well over ninety percent of cases
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161

of the plea bargaining process. Nor are the vulnerabilities of
this sorting device limited to the final stages of a case. The
criminal justice system is made up of a series of discretionary
decisions that help determine who ends up with a conviction,
162
163
and who does not : whether an alleged crime is reported;
164
165
where, whom, and how to police; whether to arrest; wheth166
167
168
er and how to charge; whether to dismiss, divert, or parare resolved with guilty pleas, almost all of which involve plea bargains, trading off a lesser amount of punishment in return for a certain conviction. The
federal sentencing guidelines make the ‘plea discount’ explicit by reducing an
offender’s guideline sentence if he ‘clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility,’ which generally requires a plea of guilty.” (quoting U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2006))); Lucian E. Dervan, Bargained Justice:
Plea-Bargaining’s Innocence Problem and the Brady Safety-Valve, 2012 UTAH
L. REV. 51, 84–86 (asserting that “it is clear that plea-bargaining has an innocence problem,” and surveying estimates).
161. See Cahill, supra note 109, at 817 (stating that in the area of plea bargaining, federal prosecutors engage in “unguided and unreviewable exercises
of prosecutorial discretion in individual cases”).
162. See Douglas Husak, Is the Criminal Law Important?, 1 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 261, 268–69 (2003); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1997)
[hereinafter Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship] (“[T]he criminal justice system is
characterized by extraordinary discretion—over the definition of crimes (legislatures can criminalize as much as they wish), over enforcement (police and
prosecutors can arrest and charge whom they wish), and over funding (legislatures can allocate resources as they wish).”).
163. See DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT’S, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT: REPORTING TO POLICE AND MEDICAL ATTENTION, 1992–2000 at 3
(2002) (suggesting that 54% of alleged rapes are not reported to the police).
164. Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Criminal Justice, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 123, 125 (2008) (“The search for drugs has animated policing practices that
increase racial disparities in encounters with the police, and also disparities in
the ratings and outcomes of those encounters.”); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 784 (2006) (local
police and prosecutors “focus too much attention on the crimes of the poor and
too little on the crimes of the middle class”).
165. See Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 158, at 506 (“[T]he law
does not by itself determine who is and isn’t punished. Some criminals evade
detection, police and prosecutors frequently decline to arrest or charge, and
juries sometimes refuse to convict.”).
166. Husak, supra note 162, at 269 (stating that “relevantly similar” people
who are prosecuted may be charged with different crimes).
167. See BESIKI KUTATELADZE ET AL., DO RACE AND ETHNICITY MATTER IN
PROSECUTION? A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE
(2012) (identifying six prosecutorial discretion points: initial screening, pretrial release and bail procedure, dismissal, charge reduction, guilty plea, and
sentencing).
168. See Willacy v. State, 640 So. 2d 1079, 1082 (Fla. 1994) (holding that a
juror was not statutorily disqualified under a state statute disqualifying, inter
alia, those “under prosecution for any crime,” since the juror was enrolled in
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169

don; whether to offer something in return for a plea bar170
171
gain, or for cooperation, and if so what; whether the ju172
rors—or, in some states, most of the jurors —make the subjec173
tive decision to convict; whether defense attorneys have the
174
wherewithal to bring a successful defense or appeal. Where
175
there is discretion there is the risk of disparity, and indeed
racial and/or ethic disparities have been found at each of the
176
main points of prosecutorial discretion. Where there is discre“pretrial intervention program,” and “[p]retrial intervention is merely an alternative to prosecution” (quoting Cleveland v. State, 417 So. 2d 653, 654 (Fla.
1982) (holding that “[t]he pretrial intervention program is merely an alternative to prosecution and should remain in the prosecutor’s discretion”))).
169. See Dafna Linzer & Jennifer LaFleur, Presidential Pardons Heavily
Favor Whites, PRO PUBLICA (Dec. 3, 2011, 11:00PM), http://www.propublica
.org/article/shades-of-mercy-presidential-forgiveness-heavily-favors-whites.
170. See Cahill, supra note 109, at 817.
171. See Stephanos Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise
of Prosecutorial Power to Plea Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295,
299 (2004) (describing the “inequality and disparities” involved in the awarding of “substantial-assistance departures”); Cahill, supra note 109, at 854.
172. See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 87, at 1263 (describing the “emerging acceptance of non-unanimous verdicts in criminal cases, in which ten or
sometimes nine of twelve jurors are permitted to issue the verdict”).
173. See Gary T. Lowenthal, Joint Representation in Criminal Cases: A
Critical Appraisal, 64 VA. L. REV. 939, 942 (1978) (“[A] trier of fact is free to
ignore the evidence in acquitting the defendant.”); Eric L. Muller, Solving the
Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and the Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93, 144 (1996) (“[C]riminal verdicts are not just findings of
historical fact, but expressions of an inescapably subjective consensus reached
among jurors who bring discrete viewpoints and perspectives to their deliberations.”).
174. See Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 158, at 570 n.242 (“Legislatures . . . fund appointed defense counsel at levels that require an enormous
amount of selectivity—counsel can contest only a very small fraction of the
cases on their dockets, and can investigate only a small fraction of the claims
their clients might have . . . . The consequence is to steer criminal litigation
away from the facts, and toward more cheaply raised constitutional claims.
Those claims tend not to correlate with innocence; or, if they do, the correlation may be perverse.”).
175. See Johnson, supra note 71, at 193 (“[T]he racial overlay to the criminal justice system in the United States strongly suggests that the criminal
laws are unevenly enforced. Race-based law enforcement has plagued the nation for centuries and continues to do so.” (citations omitted)).
176. See KUTATELADZE ET AL., supra note 167, at 7–16 (citing empirical research showing racial and/or ethnic disparities at each of six prosecutorial discretion points); M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal
Criminal Charging and Its Sentencing Consequences 7–16 (Program in Law &
Econ., Working Paper No. 12-002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1985377 (demonstrating charging disparity in federal
district court).
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177

tion there is also the risk of bias, and indeed indications of
implicit, or unconscious, bias, have been found in key criminal
178
179
justice decisionmakers: police officers, judges, defense at180
181
182
torneys, prosecutors, and juries. Caseload pressures affecting these decisionmakers increase the risk of arbitrari183
ness.
Second, the label of “criminal conviction” fails to supply an
184
adequate proxy for a character unfit for jury service. Both the
law and those alleged to have violated it complicate the purported connection. With regard to the law, convictions can oc-

177. See Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 162, at 5 (“In a system so
dominated by discretionary decisions, discrimination is easy.”).
178. See Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer's Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1317–18 (2002).
179. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect
Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1196–97 (2009).
180. See Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death Penalty Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539, 1555 (2004).
181. See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 884 (2009)
(“[E]ven after controlling for legally relevant factors, race and gender affect
charging and sentencing decisions.”).
182. See Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The
Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 207–08
(2010). The case of presidential pardons is also worth considering. A recent
study indicated that African Americans are four times less likely to succeed in
their pardon applications than Whites. Linzer & LaFleur, supra note 169 (noting that a Justice Department official was unable to offer an explanation).
183. See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An
Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
583, 601–02 (2005) (“Extreme docket pressure characterizes DAs’ offices . . . .
Local police, on whom district attorneys must depend, also labor under severe
resource constraints.”); Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 158, at 570
n.242 (“[L]egislatures . . . fund appointed defense counsel at levels that require
an enormous amount of selectivity—counsel can contest only a very small fraction of the cases on their dockets, and can investigate only a small fraction of
the claims their clients might have.”).
184. Unfairness, after all, is not a crime. See Yankah, supra note 127, at
1037 (“[C]riminal punishment is an ill-conceived proxy for punishing character.”). One Texas court appeared to acknowledge that at least some convictions
may stem from something other than malignant character—even while holding fast to such a connection in other contexts. Loredo v. State, 47 S.W.3d 55,
58 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (“While certainly not wanting to condone or trivialize
the effects of petty theft, it must be noted that such theft is frequently the result of spur-of-the-moment impulses or compulsions or even of pranks or
dares. It certainly does not require or evidence the kind of planning, the dishonesty, the moral turpitude, or the disdain for our laws and institutions intrinsic to bribery, perjury, and forgery, and even higher levels of theft.”).
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cur in the absence of any culpable mental state, and in the
186
absence of any understanding that the law is being broken.
As Doug Husak writes, “[it] is hard to believe that many of us
187
have not committed countless state and federal offenses.”
With regard to those alleged to have violated the law, the prevalence of social disadvantage among those who are convicted
complicates the notion that it is character flaws that are re188
sponsible for criminal convictions.
Even with regard to felony convictions, the same types of
objections exist. First, the distinction between felony and misdemeanor convictions is a less than solid basis on which to rest
this civic exclusion. Far from having a fixed referent, the label
189
of “felon” has been applied increasingly broadly, as the num190
ber of felonies has expanded, and the number of people with

185. See Perez v. State, 11 S.W.3d 218, 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (finding
that felony driving while intoxicated does not require a culpable mental state);
Jeffrey A. Meyer, Authentically Innocent: Juries and Federal Regulatory
Crimes, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 137, 137 (2007) (“For a wide range of the most commonly charged federal crimes, judges routinely instruct juries to convict defendants regardless of their moral culpability—that is, even if there is no proof
or finding that the defendant knew she was doing something wrong.”).
186. See Edwin Meese III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering the Mistake
of Law Defense, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 725, 739–40 (2012) (suggesting that mistake of law doctrine should be reconsidered in light of the fact that
with over 300,000 ways of violating the federal criminal law one can no longer
be presumed to know the law).
187. Husak, supra note 162, at 268; id. at 268–69 (adding that “relatively
few of us have actually been punished,” and that “we have been spared
through exercises of discretion”).
188. See DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 336 (Erwin
Chemerinsky et al. eds., 6th ed. 2008) (explaining that juror qualifications
such as “no prior felony convictions” are “standards rather easily met by the
middle-class but which easily ensnare the poor”); Richard Delgado, The
Wretched of the Earth, 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1, 11 (2011) (“[L]aw, alone
among major disciplines, proceeds . . . as though two individuals raised under
radically different circumstances have equal chances to conform their behavior
to society’s dictates.”); Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal
Democracy, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 307, 371 (2004) [hereinafter Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment]; id. at 319 (explaining that an “unjust distribution of society’s goods” means that “citizens will differ dramatically in terms of both the
pressures and temptations they face to offend against others, and the economic and moral resources with which they are equipped to resist such pressures
and temptations”).
189. See Kalt, supra note 7, at 101 (“[T]he fact remains that ostracism
means something very different now than it did in the 1970s, when the proportion of felons in the population was less than one-half of what it is today.”).
190. See Johnson, supra note 71, at 191 (mentioning the “dramatic expansion of the crimes that constitute felonies”).
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felony convictions has grown to more than twenty million. At
192
common law, felonies were a narrow group of offenses, all
193
punishable by death, and all deemed to be “inherently moral194
ly wrong.” Now, however, there are “numerous felonies, but
195
not all are serious, or mala in se, or life-endangering.” Indeed, Harvey Silverglate estimates that each of us unwittingly
196
commits three felonies a day. The distinction between felony
and misdemeanor now seems, as the Supreme Court has put it,
197
“increasingly technical,” and may be detached from measures
198
199
of relative threat, or of factual guilt. It can be one’s prior
record, for example, rather than any difference in the instant
offense, that makes that offense a felony rather than a misde200
meanor. The distinction is not only technical but also discre191. Love, supra note 19.
192. See Elizabeth Kelly, State v. Fields: Felony Murder and Psychological
Use of a Deadly Weapon, 65 N.C. L. REV. 1220, 1220 n.1 (1987) (“The commonlaw felonies, other than murder, were rape, sodomy, robbery, burglary, arson,
mayhem, and larceny.”).
193. James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A
Study of the Forces That Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1429, 1445–46 (1994).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1447.
196. L. Gordon Crovitz, You Commit Three Felonies a Day, WALL ST. J.
Sept. 28, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704471504574
438900830760842.html.
197. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 14 (1985) (“[W]hile in earlier times
the gulf between the felonies and the minor offences was broad and deep, today the distinction is minor and often arbitrary. Many crimes classified as
misdemeanors, or nonexistent, at common law are now felonies. These changes have . . . made the assumption that a ‘felon’ is more dangerous than a misdemeanant untenable. Indeed, numerous misdemeanors involve conduct more
dangerous than many felonies.”); id. at 16 n.12 (“White collar crime, for example, poses a less significant physical threat than, say, drunken driving.”).
198. Id.
199. See Ted Chiricos et al., The Labeling of Convicted Felons and Its Consequences for Recidivism, 45 CRIMINOLOGY 547, 548 (2007) (“The state of Florida has a law [FLA. STAT. § 948.01 (2013)] that allows individuals who have
been found guilty of a felony, either by a judge, jury, or plea, to literally avoid
the label of convicted felon. Judges have the option of ‘withholding adjudication’ of guilt for convicted felons who are being sentenced to probation. The
consequence of this unique labeling event is that offenders who are equivalent
in terms of factual guilt can either be labeled a convicted felon or not.”).
200. See, e.g., Smith & Sarma, supra note 68, at 405 (“In Louisiana, possession of marijuana is a misdemeanor offense. However, if a person is arrested
for marijuana possession, second offense, the district attorney possesses the
discretion to choose whether to charge the crime again as a ‘first offense,’ resulting only in a misdemeanor conviction, or the prosecutor can choose to
charge the same possession as a marijuana ‘second offense’ . . . .”); see also
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tionary, since the difference between a felony and a misdemeanor conviction can rest on a decision about what to
201
charge; or what to offer in return for a plea bargain or for co202
operation. The reality is thus quite different from the assertion, made breezily by one court in upholding the state’s exclusions, that “[t]hose who are convicted of felonies freely chose to
203
commit felonies.”
Second, the label of “felony conviction” fails to supply an
adequate proxy for a character unfit for jury service. Felony
convictions have expanded beyond the realm of mala in se of204
fenses, and can now be attached to mala prohibita; some fel205
onies are strict liability offenses. Regimes of jury exclusion
206
have not kept pace with these changes in the criminal law.
Methods of determining juror fitness before the current regime of statutory exclusions were flawed: the discretion enjoyed
207
by jury commissioners permitted bias. Yet, in the move toward a purportedly objective standard the discretion and bias
have not been shed. Rather, they persist, sprinkled throughout
the criminal justice system, and undermine the validity of automatic exclusions based on criminal convictions.

ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-111 (LexisNexis 2012) (determining which driving
while intoxicated offenses constitute felonies based on prior record).
201. See Smith & Sarma, supra note 68, at 405 (explaining that “second offense” marijuana possession is a felony that carries a maximum of five years
imprisonment).
202. See Montré D. Carodine, Keeping It Real: Reforming the “Untried Conviction” Impeachment Rule, 69 MD. L. REV. 501, 547 (2010) (“In the prosecutor’s decision whether to charge and then offer a plea deal, the strength of the
case against a defendant in reality might not factor at all.”).
203. State v. Crocker, 982 P.2d 45, 48 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).
204. See Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal “Code” Is a Disgrace:
Obstruction Statutes as Case Study, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 657
(2006).
205. See, e.g., Perez v. State, 11 S.W.3d 218, 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)
(felony driving while intoxicated does not require a culpable mental state).
206. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 n.4 (1952) (“Historically, our substantive criminal law is based on a theory of punishing the [vicious] will. It postulates a free agent confronted with a choice between doing
right and doing wrong, and choosing freely to do wrong.”).
207. See Kalt, supra note 7, at 178.
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C. THE “PURITY” OF THE JURY
The exclusion of those with criminal records is often justi208
fied as necessary to maintaining jury “purity.” In the view of
one court, for example:
[i]t cannot be said that [the ‘purity and efficiency’ guaranteed to the
Texas jury system by the state constitution] is maintained by permitting juries to be composed of thieves, robbers, murderers, kidnappers,
perjurers, rapists, drug dealers and others convicted of felonies simp209
ly because they successfully completed their terms of probation.

Another court criticized a Texas statute on the grounds that it
“allow[ed] juries to be empaneled with persons who have been
‘convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery or other high crimes,’
210
thereby destroying the jury’s purity.”
These invocations of purity rest, when they occur in Texas,
on a misunderstanding. The misunderstanding concerns what
the supposedly “pure” entity is. The Texas constitution has,
since 1867, contained a provision that “[t]he right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate. The Legislature shall pass such laws
as may be needed to regulate the same, and to maintain its pu211
rity and efficiency.” Texas courts have differed about what
the meaning of “its” is. As shown above, some lower courts have
interpreted this provision as forbidding the service of those who
212
would pollute the otherwise pure jury. A judge on the Court
of Criminal Appeals had to point out that “purity” refers not to
jury composition, but rather to the right:
The words “purity and efficiency” relate to the right to a trial by jury,
not to the jury itself. The purity of the right is maintained by providing the right in all cases for all issues that the jury is required to de213
cide (assuming the right has not been waived).

208. See, e.g., Firestone v. Freiling, 188 N.E.2d 91, 96 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1963)
(“It is . . . the duty of a court to preserve the purity of trials by jury.”).
209. R.R.E. v. Glenn, 884 S.W.2d 189, 193 (Tex. App. 1994) (rejecting the
argument that a state statute could constitutionally permit a judge to restore
jury rights of those who have felony convictions and have been successful under community supervision).
210. Perez v. State, 973 S.W.2d 759, 761–62 (Tex. App. 1998) (discussing
statutory requirement that any motion to reverse a conviction because of a
post-verdict discovery of a juror’s lack of qualification be accompanied by a
“showing of significant harm by the service of the disqualified juror,” and stating that this “offensive” requirement “does not effect the constitution’s purpose
to maintain the purity of the jury’s composition of qualified persons”).
211. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15.
212. See, e.g., Perez, 973 S.W.2d at 762.
213. Perez v. State, 11 S.W.3d 218, 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (Keller, J.,
concurring).
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214

Yet other jurisdictions invoke “purity” also, as well as related
215
216
concepts. Whether the word used is “taint,” “pollution,” or
217
“incompetence,” the language adopted to justify jury exclu218
sion often suggests dehumanization, and a racial subtext.
The notion of the “purity of the jury,” for example, evokes the
219
racialized vision of the “purity of the ballot box,” a frequent
justification for jury exclusion’s closest cousin: disenfranchise214. See, e.g., Firestone v. Freiling, 188 N.E.2d 91, 96 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1963).
215. See JUROR COMPENSATION AND QUALIFICATION, supra note 49 (“A
person who has been convicted of a felony might have a tainted view of the
criminal justice system and sympathize with a criminal defendant.”).
216. See Amaya v. State, 220 S.W. 98, 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1920) (“[T]he
object of the Legislature appears to be . . . the protection of society against the
pollution of the jury system by committing its execution to persons whose
moral status has been judicially established as criminal.”); Matthew Benjamin, Possessing Pollution, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 733, 767 n.276
(2007) (stating that “pollution anxieties have been exploited to justify . . . legal
restrictions that continue to have profoundly inequitable consequences, including felon disenfranchisement,” commonly justified on the basis of trying to
preserve the “purity of the ballot box”).
217. Jury exclusion is frequently based on the idea of “incompetence.” Tennessee’s statute is entitled “Incompetent Persons.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-1102 (2013); see also MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-1 (2013) (defining “competent juror”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-1-105(2) (2013) (“A person who has been convicted of a felony which has not been expunged is not competent to serve as a
juror.”); James M. Binnall, A Felon Deliberates: Policy Implications of the
Michigan Supreme Court’s Holding in People v. Miller, 87 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 59, 68 (2010) (“While lawmakers once employed the ‘neo-contractarian’
justification for subjecting those with a felony criminal record to civic restrictions, the more contemporary view is that all felons are somehow incompetent and unable to fulfill the requisite duties of civic life.”).
218. For racial subtext of “incompetence,” see Cynthia K.Y. Lee, Race and
the Victim: An Examination of Capital Sentencing and Guilt Attribution Studies, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 533, 534 (1998) (“Racial stereotypes about Blacks
being less intelligent and less competent than non-Blacks constituted the subtext underlying much of the criticism of the [O.J. Simpson] verdict and subsequent cries for reform of the jury system.”); Lee, supra note 87, at 413 (mentioning “oft-unstated assumption” that “blacks are not necessarily granted a
presumption of innocence, competence, or even complete humanity”).
219. See Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and
the Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259, 312 (2004) (“Unfortunately, as the Supreme Court held in Hunter v. Underwood, Alabama’s felon disenfranchisement provision was designed to maintain white supremacy; the ballot box
purity was of the racial variety.”); Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons:
Citizenship, Criminality, and ‘The Purity of the Ballot Box’, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1300, 1313 (1989) (“The image [of the ‘purity of the ballot box’] suggests not
only that former offenders are impure, but also that their impurity may be
contagious. It reflects a belief that clear boundaries must be maintained between the attainted criminal and the virtuous citizenry, lest contamination
occur.”).
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ment. Both types of exclusion have served racially discrimina220
221
tory ends, and bring continuing racial disparity.
Even if one were to put racial overtones aside, and consider
the notion of a “pure” jury, such a goal seems illusory—and certainly not obtainable through exclusion of one portion of the citizenry. Jury service is a messy business. Jurors are not angel222
223
ic; juries are not sacrosanct. Rather, jurors are humans,
224
and they misbehave. For example, the electronic age has given them boundless opportunities to Google or tweet their way
225
into disgrace. In addition, study after study indicates that ju220. For disenfranchisement, see Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 639 (1993)
(noting that “‘good character’ provisos were devised to deprive black voters of
the franchise”); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227, 229 (1985) (holding
that Alabama constitutional provision limiting the franchise based on certain
convictions “was enacted with the intent of disenfranchising blacks,” and violated the Fourteenth Amendment); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145,
153 (1965) (finding that provisions of the Louisiana Constitution and statutes
limiting the franchise violated constitutional protection against discrimination
in voting). For jury service, see Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge:
Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory
Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 116 (1990) (“During the era of slavery in
this country, blacks were viewed as intellectually and morally inferior to
whites, and incapable of rendering judgments against them.”); Grant H. Morris, The Greatest Legal Movie of All Time: Proclaiming the Real Winner, 47
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 533, 538–39 (2010) (“Jim Crow laws were . . . used to discourage African Americans from registering to vote. Because jurors were selected from voter registration lists, Jim Crow laws prevented African Americans from serving on juries.”).
221. For voting, see Tanya Dugree-Pearson, Disenfranchisement—A Race
Neutral Punishment for Felony Offenders or a Way to Diminish the Minority
Vote?, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 359, 375–77 (2002). For jury service, see
supra Part II.A.
222. United States v. Ippolito, 10 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1312 (M.D. Fla. 1998)
(“Neither the government nor the defendant is entitled as a matter of right to
an angelic and perfectly discerning jury . . . .”).
223. See James M. Binnall, Convicts in Court: Felonious Lawyers Make a
Case for Including Convicted Felons in the Jury Pool, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1379,
1408–09 (2010) (“[W]hile stopping well short of conceding that the jury system
is an ineffective method of administering justice, one can conservatively dismiss the notion that the jury is the type of sacrosanct institution many felon
jury exclusion proponents claim necessitates the outright eviction of those who
have perhaps committed but one legal indiscretion.”).
224. See Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Mayor of Balt., 670 A.2d 986,
1001 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (“To be qualified as a juror, one need not have
lived a blameless life, nor must a juror be ‘good.’”).
225. See Amanda McGee, Note, Juror Misconduct in the Twenty-First Century: The Prevalence of the Internet and Its Effect on American Courtrooms, 30
LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 301, 301–02 (2010); Suzi Parker, Arkansas Death Row
Inmate Gets New Trial Because of Tweets, REUTERS (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www
.reuters.com/article/2011/12/08/us-crime-twitter-arkansas-idUSTRE7B72C220
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227

rors assume guilt, often in racialized ways, and put unjusti228
fied stock in the credibility of governmental employees. Perhaps the best that can be hoped is that if enough different biases and backgrounds are thrown together, the biases of the
229
various jurors will “cancel each other out,” and that diversity
230
will “beget[] impartiality.” Whereas members of one legislature speculated that the view of the criminal justice system
231
held by someone who has been through it might be “tainted,”
it might, rather, be a necessary shade in a spectrum of views.
The pureness of the vision of the jury is hampered, rather than
enhanced, by the exclusion of one portion of human experience,
and the concomitant insistence on ignorance.
111208 (reporting that juror tweets were responsible for new murder trial);
John Schwartz, As Jurors Turn to Web, Mistrials Are Popping up, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 17, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/us/18juries.html?_r=0 (reporting that jurors violated judicial instructions not to conduct independent
research).
226. Gertner, supra note 99, at 931 (“Studies regularly suggest that juries
believe that because someone is accused, they are likely to be guilty.”); see,
e.g., Mitchell J. Frank & Dawn Broschard, The Silent Criminal Defendant and
the Presumption of Innocence: In the Hands of Real Jurors, Is Either of Them
Safe?, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 237, 248–49 (2006).
227. See, e.g., Levinson et al., supra note 182, at 190 (demonstrating that
mock jurors “held strong associations between Black and Guilty, relative to
White and Guilty, and [that] implicit associations predicted the way mock jurors evaluated ambiguous evidence”).
228. See supra Part II.B (discussing how jurors assume prosecutors and
police act with integrity even though evidence shows this is not always true).
229. People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 754–55 (Cal. 1978) (“The rationale of
these [Supreme Court cross-section cases], often unstated, is that in our heterogeneous society jurors will inevitably belong to diverse and often overlapping
groups defined by race, religion, ethnic or national origin, sex, age, education,
occupation, economic condition, place of residence, and political affiliation;
that it is unrealistic to expect jurors to be devoid of opinions, preconceptions,
or even deep-rooted biases derived from their life experiences in such groups;
and hence that the only practical way to achieve an overall impartiality is to
encourage the representation of a variety of such groups on the jury so that
the respective biases of their members, to the extent they are antagonistic,
will tend to cancel each other out.”). Juror education on the topic of bias may
also be effective. See, e.g., Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection and
Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827, 868–69 (2012) [hereinafter Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury].
230. State v. LaMere, 2 P.3d 204, 219 (Mont. 2000) (“American jurisprudence [believes] that a jury constituted of individuals with diverse perspectives, coming from the various classes of society, is greater than the sum of its
respective parts and can better arrive at a common sense judgment about a set
of facts than can any individual . . . . In short, it is believed that diversity begets impartiality.”).
231. See JUROR COMPENSATION AND QUALIFICATION, supra note 49.
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D. EMBITTERMENT AGAINST THE SYSTEM
Another common justification for the exclusion of those
with criminal records from jury service is that those who have
been through the system can be assumed to be so embittered by
it that they cannot be relied upon to be fair: that voir dire or no
voir dire, oath or no oath, instructions or no instructions, they
would be too hostile to the state. Thus, for example, one court
noted that:
The Legislature could reasonably determine that a person who has
suffered the most severe form of condemnation that can be inflicted
by the state—a conviction of felony and punishment therefor—might
well harbor a continuing resentment against “‘the system”‘ that punished him and an equally unthinking bias in favor of the defendant on
232
trial, who is seen as a fellow underdog caught in its toils.

Another state based its exclusion statute on the notion that “[a]
person who has been convicted of a felony might have a tainted
view of the criminal justice system and sympathize with a criminal defendant,” and that “[s]uch a situation is blatantly unfair
233
to the prosecution and the crime victim.”
The concern about blatant unfairness is undermined by the
fact that courts offer no more support for this justification than
they do for the others. In one recent case, the Michigan Supreme Court cited a few articles in support of its assertion that
“[h]aving been previously convicted of similar offenses, the juror, if anything, likely would have been sympathetic towards
234
defendant.” One of those articles describes such a rationale as
235
a “gross” and “needless” overgeneralization;
another de236
scribes it as a rationale “without foundation.” The implications and consequences of the “embitterment” rationale are too
important to allow the rationale to go uninvestigated. If the assumption of “embitterment” is false, then the grave consequence of civic exclusion should not be allowed to rest on it. If
the assumption is true, a deeper response than exclusion of jurors is needed. Investigation is therefore required into whether

232. Rubio v. Super. Ct., 593 P.2d 595, 600 (Cal. 1979) (en banc).
233. JUROR COMPENSATION AND QUALIFICATION, supra note 49.
234. People v. Miller, 759 N.W.2d 850, 860 & n.19 (Mich. 2008).
235. Kalt, supra note 7.
236. See Note, A Jury of One’s Peers: Virginia’s Restoration of Rights Process and Its Disproportionate Effect on the African American Community, 46
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2109, 2137 (2005) (“Disallowing convicted felons to serve
as jury members may be unnecessary, as any jury member who is biased may
be struck for cause by the judge or by use of a peremptory strike.”).
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the criminal justice system can indeed be assumed to embitter
beyond fairness those who pass through it.
There are reasons why the assumption that a criminal
conviction leads to embitterment against the state might be
237
false. After all, the assumption appears to ignore the fact that
many defendants frequently have more complex relationships
than purely oppositional ones with the state: many will have
238
cooperated with the state, most will have reached a bargain
239
with the state, and a great many will have been alleged victims of criminal offenses and thus potentially championed by
240
the state.
On the other hand, there are a host of reasons why the assumption might be accurate. The criminal justice system is suf241
242
fused with disparities, is vulnerable to error, and is often
243
detached from community notions of justice. Potential causes
237. One federal judge proposed two hypotheses to explain why a juror
with a felony conviction might be biased in favor of a guilty verdict. United
States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Randolph, J., dissenting in
part, concurring in part). First, the juror “may have developed a callous cynicism about protestations of innocence, having no doubt heard many such laments while incarcerated.” Id. Second, the juror’s “desire to show others—and
himself—that he is now a good citizen might lead him to display an excess of
rectitude, both in his deliberations and in his vote.” Id.
238. See Bibas, supra note 171, at 299 (“[S]ubstantial-assistance departures . . . occur in more than one-sixth of all [federal] sentences.”).
239. See Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics, BUREAU OF JUST.
STAT., http://bjs.gov/fjsrc/ (follow “Offenders sentenced: tables” hyperlink: then
select year “2009”; then select “Case disposition”; then select “All values”; then
select “Frequencies” and “Percents”; then select “HTML”) (showing that roughly 96% of those sentenced resolved their cases by guilty plea).
240. Bernard E. Harcourt, An Institutionalization Effect: The Impact of
Mental Hospitalization and Imprisonment on Homicide in the United States,
1934–2001, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 44 (2011).
241. See Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias
and the Department of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271, 322 (2013) [hereinafter
Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration] (“[A]s mass incarceration stays with
us, its glaring racial disparities continue . . . .”); Roberts, Cost of Mass Incarceration, supra note 130, at 1295 (“Residents have good reason to distrust a
criminal justice system that has treated them with disrespect, bias, and brutality.”); Michael Rocque, Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System
and Perceptions of Legitimacy, 1 RACE & JUST. 292, 293 (2011) (advancing a
theoretical linkage between racial disparity in criminal justice and an individual’s perception of the legitimacy of the law).
242. See GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 102, at 3.
243. See Fagan, supra note 164, at 123 (“Surveys of public opinion over four
decades consistently show that Americans have little confidence in the fairness or effectiveness of the criminal justice system and criminal law more generally.”); Paul H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory:
Doing Justice as Controlling Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1089, 1107 (2010) (“One
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of embitterment exist throughout the stages of a criminal proceeding. With regard to policing, the methods used may pro244
voke resentment. With regard to the court system, having a
voice in the system is a crucial aspect of perceived fairness of
245
that system, and yet a fear of impeachment and sentencing
enhancement often deters defendants from making their voice
246
heard on the witness stand. With regard to sentencing, prison
247
terms are often nasty, brutish, and long. Conditions of con248
finement are frequently “gratuitous[ly] inhumane,” and leave
may well ask how well current American criminal law matches the community’s intuitions of justice. The short answer is: not well. Modern crime-control
programs, such as three strikes, high drug-offense penalties, adult prosecution
of juveniles, narrowing the insanity defense, strict liability offenses, and the
felony-murder rule, all distribute criminal liability and punishment in ways
that seriously conflict with lay persons’ intuitions of justice.”).
244. See Stephen J. Schulhofer et al., American Policing at a Crossroads:
Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 335, 351 (2011) (“[I]ntensive law enforcement and a readiness
to arrest for low-level offenses is far more likely to arouse resentment, weaken
police legitimacy, and undermine voluntary compliance with the law.”).
245. See Tom R. Tyler et al., Maintaining Allegiance Toward Political Authorities: The Role of Prior Attitudes and the Use of Fair Procedures, 33 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 629, 646 (1989) [hereinafter Tyler et al., Maintaining Allegiance]
(“[S]tudies of the meaning of fair procedure suggest that defendants are very
interested in having the opportunity to present their views to decision makers
prior to having decisions made about their case.”).
246. For fear of impeachment, see John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the
Criminal Defendant with a Prior Record—Lessons from the Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 477, 477 (2008) (explaining that defense
counsel, in a sample of cases where defendants were convicted despite factual
innocence, gave fear of impeachment by prior conviction as the primary reason
that their clients did not take the stand). For fear of sentencing enhancement,
see Jeffrey Bellin, Improving the Reliability of Criminal Trials Through Legal
Rules that Encourage Defendants to Testify, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 851, 877–78
(2008).
247. See Dolovich, Exclusion and Control, supra note 131, at 265 (noting
that sentences are often “grossly disproportionate to the offense”); Stephen F.
Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127, 128 (2009) (explaining that proportionality of punishment is a concern that many prosecutors
“routinely ignore”). I borrow the phrase from Thomas Hobbes. THOMAS
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 89 (Richard Tuck, ed., Cambridge University Press rev.
student ed. 1996) (1651) (“[A]nd the life of man . . . nasty, brutish, and short.”).
248. Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment, supra note 188, at 437 (“[C]onsider,
in light of the state’s obligation to avoid gratuitous inhumane punishments,
the conditions of confinement facing inmates at prisons and jails across the
country, which strongly suggest that this requirement is routinely being violated. The widespread incidence of rape and sexual assault in prisons and jails
and the ongoing threat of such abuse, which is a permanent aspect of incarceration at many prisons, would alone serve to prove the point.”); see also id.
at 439 (describing prison overcrowding that not only exacerbates the risk of
sexual and other violence and coercion but also “depriv[es] inmates of the min-
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249

enduring effects. To say that long and tedious periods of incarceration are tantamount to “warehousing” is to be overly
generous: warehouses are, at least, supposed to keep items in a
250
stable condition. Human beings, however, are not items; they
251
decline.
If the assumption is well-founded, exclusion from jury service as a result is an inapt response. It is an amputation of one
portion of the body politic in lieu of treatment, or even diagnosis, or even investigation, of the underlying condition. Automatic, cost-free exclusions on the basis of assumed embitterment
permit the state to avoid the consequences of something potentially very wrong with the state.
The criminal justice system is not supposed to embitter
those who pass through it to such an extent that they cannot be
fair. Theories of punishment do not advocate such an arrange252
ment, and theories of procedural justice run directly counter
imum physical space humans need to preserve a sense of self”); Eva S. Nilsen,
Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane Punishment to Constitutional Discourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 111, 113 (2007) (“American punishment has become degrading, indecent, and undeservedly harsher despite a
Constitution designed to protect people from infliction of excessive punishment
. . . . The indecency of punishment is compounded when individuals are sentenced to live in institutions where they suffer substantial physical and psychological harm.”).
249. See Craig Haney, Counting Casualties in the War on Prisoners, 43
U.S.F. L. REV. 87, 107 (2008) (“[P]eople who are subjected to extreme forms of
imprisonment can be psychologically harmed—sometimes irreparably so—by
the experience. Moreover, most prisoners cannot leave the psychic scars of
these experiences miraculously behind them upon release, just as most people
cannot simply choose to set aside the aftereffects of damaging, traumatic
events.”).
250. See Edward Rubin, Just Say No to Retribution, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
17, 72–73 (2003) (“If not provided with mental stimulation and human interaction, [humans] tend to deteriorate; if not given an opportunity to practice acquired skills, those skills that they possess become impaired, thereby reducing
the person’s economic value to himself and to society. Thus, even a good warehouse would provide prisoners with many of the programmatic features we
identify as rehabilitative, and a good prison would certainly include those features.”).
251. See id. at 72.
252. Note that one of the stated requisites of a federal sentence is “to promote respect for the law.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2012); see also Stephanos
Bibas, Forgiveness in Criminal Procedure, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 329, 342
(2007) (“The point of punishment is not to ostracize criminals into a permanent underclass, embittered and tempted to revictimize a society that shuns
them.”). Many scholars note the apparent abandonment of traditional theories
of punishment in a penal system that represents a “war on prisoners.” See,
e.g., Craig Haney, Politicizing Crime and Punishment: Redefining “Justice” to
Fight the “War on Prisoners”, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 373, 376 (2012); Robert Weis-
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to the unquestioning acceptance of the “embitterment” ra253
tionale. For example, Tom Tyler and his colleagues’ work
demonstrates that those who have been through the criminal
justice system—even those who have incurred felony convic254
tions —do not necessarily view the criminal justice system as
255
unfair, and that this is a precious thing, since perceived fair256
ness helps bring about compliance with legal regimes. The
functioning of the criminal justice system relies on acceptance
257
from those affected by it; it cannot run on embitterment.
berg, Reality-Challenged Philosophies of Punishment, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1203,
1207 (2012) (“[O]ur standard litany of punishment theories is simply irrelevant to the reality we confront . . . . It is a system that, deliberately or not, reinforces the economics and demographics of diminished social status, and does
so in reckless disregard of its measurable consequences.”); see also Dolovich,
Exclusion and Control, supra note 131, at 261 (“[T]he more familiar way[] of
construing the penal system [is] as the means to achieve retribution or to ensure public safety by deterring or otherwise preventing the commission of
crime. But a close look at the way the system actually operates makes clear
the poor fit between these more conventional explanations and the realities of
American penal practice.”).
253. See Schulhofer et al., supra note 244, at 345–46 (“The procedural justice concept captures the fairness of the process used to make and apply rules
and the quality of the personal treatment people receive from authorities.”).
254. Indeed, the more serious the case, the more study participants placed
weight on perceived procedural fairness in evaluating their experiences. Tyler
et al., Maintaining Allegiance, supra note 245, at 641 n.6.
255. See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING
PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 53 (2002) (noting that in
one survey over 70% of participants “felt that the authorities with whom they
dealt used fair procedures and that they treated people fairly”); Jonathan D.
Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 483,
494 (1988) (finding that procedural justice made a “significant and independent contribution” to three separate measures of litigant satisfaction, even for
litigants facing felony charges and punitive outcomes); Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Procedural Justice: A Test of the Group-Value Model, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 830, 837 (1989) (finding that a sense of fair treatment
rather than outcome is a better predictor of satisfaction with treatment by legal authorities); Tyler et al., Maintaining Allegiance, supra note 245, at 645
(“[T]he government can influence the impact of negative outcomes on allegiance by delivering those outcomes through procedures that citizens will view
as fair.”).
256. See Schulhofer et al., supra note 244, at 338; Tyler et al., Maintaining
Allegiance, supra note 245, at 631 (viewing the law as a “positive and benevolent force that is fairly and equally applied across citizens” increases behavioral obedience to the law); id. at 645 (“[T]he manner in which citizens are
treated is a key factor in the impact of their experiences on views about law
and government.”).
257. Paul H. Robinson et al., The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1940, 1995–96 (2010) (“[E]ffective operation of the criminal justice system depends upon the cooperation, or at least the acquiescence, of those involved in
it—offenders, judges, jurors, witnesses, prosecutors, police, and others. To the
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Thus, if there is concern about the criminal justice system causing embitterment, the answer is not automatic exclusion, but
careful investigation; if necessary, as discussed in the next
Part, incentives should be adjusted so that such investigation is
more likely to occur.
IV. THE PROPOSAL
This Part puts forth a proposal in response to two conclusions: first, that the justifications given for automatic exclusions do not outweigh the harms that these exclusions cause,
and second, that the state should not be permitted to invoke
the “embittered against the state” assumption without litigation cost. It then explains the proposal’s scholarly context, before discussing necessary corollaries, and possible objections, to
the proposal.
This Article’s proposal is that automatic exclusions based
solely on a potential juror’s criminal record—whether effected
through mailing of summonses only to those on the voting rolls,
statutory disqualifications, or automatic granting of challenges
for cause—should be abandoned. Discretionary granting of
challenges for cause where jurors have a demonstrated bias
should remain available. Where there is no demonstrated bias,
the peremptory challenge should be the only means by which
attorneys can remove jurors with criminal convictions. This
combination of discretionary challenges for cause and peremptory challenges has been deemed a sufficient screening mecha258
nism in the case of complaining witnesses, and in the case of

extent that people see the system as unjust—as in conflict with their intuitions about justice—acquiescence and cooperation are likely to fade and be replaced with subversion and resistance.”).
258. In the case of Texas, for example, where a misdemeanor theft conviction or any felony conviction mean exclusion for life, as do pending charges for
the same offenses, parallel exclusions have been rejected for complaining witnesses. See Rubio v. Super. Ct., 593 P.2d 595, 609 (Cal. 1979) (en banc)
(Tobriner, J., dissenting) (“[J]ust as pro-defendant bias is presumed of exfelons by the exclusionary scheme, the converse corollary presumption of proprosecution bias on the part of victims of crimes would dictate their automatic
exclusion as well. I fail to see how the state can reasonably differentiate between these groups in its effort to assure jury impartiality.”); Janecka v. State,
739 S.W.2d 813, 834–35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (rejecting the constitutional
claim that automatic exclusion of those under indictment for a theft or any felony should be paired with an automatic exclusion of those who are complaining witnesses in pending cases, and noting that where those in the latter
group can be shown not to be impartial, they “can of course be excluded for
cause”).
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259

law enforcement. It has been deemed a sufficient screening
mechanism in the case of those who, while lacking a criminal
record, share the same character traits used to justify these automatic exclusions: unreliability, lack of integrity, dishonesty,
260
bias, and so on. In the absence of any reliable data to the contrary, it should be deemed a sufficient screening mechanism in
the case of those with criminal convictions. In addition, this
proposal would add a litigation cost to those exclusions that are
made on the basis of an assumed embitterment against the
state, since the party that invokes this justification most of261
ten—the prosecution —would use up one of a finite number of
262
peremptory challenges each time it did so. If those who pass
through the criminal justice system are embittered against the
state, this proposal aims to incentivize the prosecution to reflect upon its role in a system assumed to be embittering, and
upon its ability to investigate and address possible causes of
embitterment. Thus, this proposal joins recent scholarly proposals that have suggested adjustments to prosecutorial incentives elsewhere in the criminal justice system. It asserts, as do
those other recent proposals, that in the criminal justice system
as currently configured there are few incentives for the state to
address the status quo hinted at in the “embitterment” rationale: a system so damaging as to preclude fair judgment by
263
its alumni.

259. See State v. Ballard, 747 So. 2d 1077, 1080 (La. 1999) (rejecting automatic disqualification of law enforcement officers in favor of discretionary ruling on cause challenge, and emphasizing the deference owed to the trial judge,
“who is in the most favorable position to determine whether a prospective juror can serve impartially”).
260. As Dolovich puts it, we are all “human beings, with all the qualities of
impulsiveness, bad judgment, proneness to error, and other limitations this
status entails.” Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment, supra note 188, at 319; id. at
368 (“[H]uman beings are not infallible. We make mistakes. We make bad
judgments. We act on impulse, and in haste. And often, when we do so, we do
wrong to others.”).
261. See, e.g., Lance Salyers, Note, Invaluable Tool v. Unfair Use of Private
Information: Examining Prosecutors’ Use of Jurors’ Criminal History Records
in Voir Dire, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1079, 1088 (1999) (explaining that Virginia prosecutors argued they should be able to use prospective jurors’ criminal history records as a means of detecting bias against the state (citation
omitted)).
262. For an exploration of the influence of litigation costs on prosecutorial
behavior, see Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and
Trial Judges, 50 TEX. L. REV. 629, 646–47 (1972).
263. See Smith & Sarma, supra note 68, at 406 (“[W]ith a felony record, exoffenders cannot participate to effectuate change by sitting in judgment of an-
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Few incentives exist at any level of government to address
264
such a status quo. There are few incentives at the legislative
265
level, because neither those with criminal convictions, nor
266
267
those who have been in prison, nor excluded jurors, have a
268
powerful lobbying voice, let alone those who may fall into all
269
three groups. What power they may once have had, in the
270
form of the vote, may be gone. There are also few incentives
at the prosecutorial level, due to a lack of prosecutorial acother defendant on a criminal jury. Discrimination by design has contributed
to self-sustaining structural inequality.”).
264. See Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 717 (1996) (“[N]o one is currently held accountable for
the successes or failures of the criminal justice system.”).
265. See Demleitner, supra note 119, at 158–59.
266. See Roberts, Cost of Mass Incarceration, supra note 130, at 1292
(“Neighborhoods with large percentages of current and former inmates lack
the political clout to influence policies and demand services.”); id. at 1295
(“The critical insight from sociological theory is that prison policy destroys the
social networks and resources necessary for communities to have a say in the
political process and to organize local institutions to contest unjust policies.
This concrete interference with political capacity creates and reinforces social
norms that question the effectiveness of collective efforts to produce social
change. Mass imprisonment impairs community structures and norms that
would channel resistance to systemic injustice in productive directions.”).
267. Leipold, supra note 18, at 987.
268. See Rubin, supra note 250, at 59 (“Ever since the first George Bush
struck a devastating political blow to his opponent with the Willie Horton
case, elected politicians have been terrified to recommend anything less than
increased severity for criminals.”).
269. See Natapoff, Speechless, supra note 17, at 1490 (“The democratic decisional process that creates criminal laws, mandatory minimum sentences,
sentencing guidelines, felon disenfranchisement laws, and registration requirements—in other words, all the punishments and burdens imposed on
criminal defendants—takes place without hearing from defendants who are in
the process of being subjected to those very laws. Once convicted and incarcerated, defendants continue their exclusion from the public debate. Their silence
begins in prison, and continues upon release, not least because of felony disenfranchisement laws and defendants’ inability to hold public office. Defendants
do not even have good proxy speakers: Their actual representatives—their attorneys—are constrained by the exigencies of litigation and sworn to secrecy.
Moreover, there are very few interest groups who speak for defendants within
the political process. Since First Amendment self-governance theory holds that
the political process derives its legitimacy from the opportunity for expressive
participation, defendants’ lack of parliamentary floor time renders their
treatment by the criminal system deeply suspect.”).
270. See Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration, supra note 241, at 314
(“With the exception of white collar defendants facing certain regulatory and
corporate crimes, generally most criminal defendants are dispersed, disorganized, poor, and in many instances, barred from voting. . . . Other groups
that may share an interest in criminal defendants’ rights are similarly powerless, particularly as compared to law enforcement.”).
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countability, the dominance of the pressure to convict, and
273
the externalization of many of the costs of prosecution. Indeed, prosecutorial incentives tend to point toward harshness
of the consequences of conviction, so that bargaining leverage
274
may be maximized.
Recent scholarly proposals have highlighted various components of the criminal justice system in which prosecutorial
incentives might be altered with the aim of bringing about re275
form, or at least awareness. Thus, Robert Smith and Justin
Levinson have proposed that prosecutors could be encouraged,
276
“perhaps with housing or tax incentives,” “to live in neighborhoods “disproportionately impacted by the charging deci277
sions made by the district attorney’s office.”
Adam
Gershowitz has urged that state officials send monthly bulle271. Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1365, 1365 (1987) (“[F]ew operate in a vacuum
so devoid of externally enforceable constraints.”).
272. See Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor’s
Office, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2089, 2091 (2010) (“[C]onvictions are the lodestar
by which prosecutors tend to be judged.”).
273. See Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 WASH.
L. REV. 69, 105 (2011) (pointing out that prosecutors externalize, and thus fail
to take into account, the costs of incarceration and public defense, and proposing that prosecutors be required to reveal to voters the costs that they are incurring or anticipate incurring, so that the costs can be internalized and can
shape decisions about whether to charge, what to charge, and what sentences
to recommend); Misner, supra note 264, at 719 (“The current flaw in the evolving power of the prosecutor is the failure to force her to face the full cost of
prosecutorial decisions.”); id. at 720 (explaining that because incarceration
driven by local prosecutors is paid for by the state, “the prosecutor has little
incentive to create prosecutorial guidelines, to become an active participant in
crime prevention programs, or to find less costly means of punishment”).
274. See Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration, supra note 241, at 312
(“[N]ot only do [prosecutors] have an interest in longer sentences and mandatory punishments, they also have an interest in opposing corrections reforms
that make the conditions of confinement more relaxed or that result in earlier
release times. Anything that makes the threat of a sentence after trial less severe limits their bargaining power to some extent.”).
275. See Gold, supra note 273, at 73 (outlining a proposal to ensure that
prosecutors consider “previously overlooked costs” created by prosecutorial decisions).
276. Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial
Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795,
826 (2012).
277. Id. Similarly, Eric Miller argues that “former felons” should be included in the grand jury, since “[l]ocalism and community participation may be
even more beneficial if . . . those communities that feel threatened by drug policy are given the means of resisting and redirecting it.” Eric J. Miller, Drugs,
Courts, and the New Penology, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 417, 457 n.244 (2009).
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tins to prosecutors, detailing state incarceration rates and prison overcrowding, in the hope that they bear this information in
278
mind when they choose plea offers. Robert Misner has suggested that county prosecutors, who drive incarceration in state
prisons, and yet do not have to pay for it, should be allocated an
imprisonment budget, and should be billed if they splurge be279
yond it.
Thus, scholars are asking how one might force open eyes
280
that currently are allowed to remain shut, and how one might
bring to bear on a costly system some of the costs that it is pro281
ducing. They seek ways in which prosecutors might be moved
from their comfort zones in terms of neighborhood, or in terms
of freedom to resolve cases through imprisonment. They seek
ways to end what Robert Weisberg calls the “reckless disregard
282
of [the] measurable consequences” of the penal system.
Having laid out the proposal and its scholarly context, this
Part now addresses some of the corollaries that it would require, and some of the objections that it might inspire.
A. THE NEED TO POLICE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
The first corollary relates to the proposal that attorneys
wanting to challenge people with criminal records would have
to do so in the peremptory phase, absent a showing of individu278. Adam M. Gershowitz, An Informational Approach to the Mass Imprisonment Problem, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 47, 65 (2008). The proposal is based on a
sense that prosecutors are insufficiently informed of, or constrained by, the
resource deficiency in the rest of the criminal justice system. Id. at 49.
279. See Misner, supra note 264, at 720 (stating that the “thrust of [his]
article is to attempt to find a mechanism for tying the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion to the availability of prison resources”).
280. See Gershowitz, supra note 278, at 49 (“On a day to day basis, most
prosecutors are probably not cognizant of the lack of resources held by the rest
of the criminal justice system. It is safe to assume that when prosecutors walk
into court, they do not ask themselves whether there is sufficient funding to
provide lawyers for all indicted defendants or whether there are enough prison
or jail beds for everyone who will be convicted.”); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Batson
Ethics for Prosecutors and Trial Court Judges, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 475, 506
(1998) (“If a case cannot stand examination by twelve jurors who fairly represent the community, it should fail. . . . And if race relations are so bad in a jurisdiction that adherence to [a set of ethical standards proposed by Professor
Johnson in the Batson context] produces more than a few wrongful acquittals,
it is time for everyone to know about it.”).
281. See Gold, supra note 273, at 105.
282. Weisberg, supra note 252, at 1207; id. at 1218 (“The incarcerated are
invisible and therefore we do not observe the powerful engine of future economic misery [that prison] operates.”).
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al bias. If exclusions are to be funneled into the peremptory
phase, it is particularly important to police the use of criminal
convictions as a pretext for purposeful discrimination at that
stage. The peremptory phase is already widely viewed, despite
the Batson protections, as a hotbed of purposeful discrimination masked by ostensibly “race-neutral” reasons for challeng283
es. Particular concern centers on the fact that connection to
the criminal justice system is one of the primary justifications
that prosecutors give in response to Batson claims alleging ra284
cial or ethnic discrimination. Thus, the use of peremptory
challenges must be more closely policed, in order to minimize
the risk that they are used to effect purposeful racial or ethnic
discrimination. This increase in policing needs to occur regardless of whether any changes are made to existing jury selection
285
procedures.
B. THE NEED TO MAKE JURY SERVICE ACCESSIBLE
The second corollary of this proposal is that increased efforts need to be made to ensure that jury service is accessible to
all. Whatever expressive benefit may come from the lifting of
exclusions, its practical benefit would be limited if jury service
remains untenable for those at the sizeable intersection be286
tween criminal convictions and low socioeconomic status.
287
Thus, states must guarantee adequate stipends, dependent
288
289
care, and job protection. Like the previous corollary, this
reform needs to occur regardless of whether any changes are
made to existing jury selection procedures.
283. See Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury, supra note 229, at 843.
284. See Roberts, Disparately Seeking Jurors, supra note 12, at 1375.
285. See Price, supra note 66, at 85 (referring, in the Batson context, to the
“miniscule amount of time spent reviewing constitutional issues in lower
courts”).
286. See Smyth, Jr., supra note 67, at 43 (“The disparate impact of the
criminal justice system on communities of poverty and of color is well documented and undeniable.”).
287. See Amar, supra note 112, at 1184–85 (“To decline to compensate citizens for their sacrifice—or to pay them $5 per day as is done in many California courts—is in effect to impose a functionally regressive poll tax that penalizes the working poor who want to serve and vote on juries, but who cannot
afford the loss of a week’s pay.”).
288. See Mary Rose, A Voir Dire of Voir Dire: Listening to Jurors’ Views
Regarding the Peremptory Challenge, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1061, 1071 (2003).
289. See David V. Wilson II, American Bar Association Principles for Juries
and Jury Trials, HOUS. LAW., Sept./Oct. 2005, at 48 (describing American Bar
Association principles aimed at job protection for jurors).
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C. WHERE LEVERAGE SHOULD BE APPLIED
One objection that might be raised to this proposal is that
it exacts a cost only on the prosecution, in an effort to stir investigation of wrongs that may have occurred in any one of the
three branches of government, in any one or more jurisdictions,
state or federal. Thus, it may be argued that leverage is being
applied bluntly, and possibly in the wrong place.
One response is that proponents of automatic exclusions
also engage in treatment of “the state” as a monolithic entity;
according to the “embitterment” justification, someone who has
been through the criminal justice system can be assumed,
whatever the particular geographic or institutional source of
his or her hardship, to have a blind resentment of the prosecution being carried out in the particular jurisdiction where the
jury has been summoned—even though that person is unlikely
290
ever to have been a defendant in a jury trial anywhere.
A deeper response is that it is not unrealistic to think that
pressure on prosecutors could lead to results from police and
legislatures, given the power dynamics within the criminal justice system. Prosecutors wield enormous power in the system
291
as currently configured. They are “the criminal justice sys292
tem’s real lawmakers,” and hold powerful roles in relation to
293
police and legislators. In some instances, they provide train-

290. Of the 81,372 defendants in federal criminal court who reached adjudication in 2009, 78,283 pled guilty; 2798, or 3.4%, faced a jury trial. Federal
Criminal Case Processing Statistics, supra note 239, available at http://bjs.ojp
.usdoj.gov/fjsrc (follow “Offenders sentenced: tables” hyperlink; then select
year “2009”; then select “Case disposition”; then select “All values”; then select
“Frequencies” and “Percents”; then select “HTML”).
291. See Price, supra note 66, at 85 (describing prosecutors, in the context
of the death penalty, as “the street-level agents of the state”).
292. Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 158, at 506–07 (“Anyone who
reads criminal codes in search of a picture of what conduct leads to a prison
term, or who reads sentencing rules in order to discover how severely different
sorts of crimes are punished, will be seriously misled.”); Barkow, Prosecutorial
Administration, supra note 241, at 273–74 (“[W]e are living in a time of ‘prosecutorial administration,’ with prosecutors at the helm of every major federal
criminal justice matter.”).
293. See Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration, supra note 241, at 272–73
(“[P]rosecutors have often been a driving force in the political arena for mandatory minimum sentences and new federal criminal laws.”); Daniel Richman,
Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 749 (2003) (describing the mutual reliance between prosecutors and police).
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294

ing for police, and in virtually all instances they have the
295
ability to influence police conduct. As for their relationships
with the legislative branch, Stuntz offers an analysis of the
structural arrangements that give prosecutors so much interbranch influence:
Advancing police and prosecutors’ goals usually means advancing legislators’ goals as well. Thus, legislators have good reason to listen
when prosecutors urge some statutory change. This point is worth
emphasizing, for it may be the single most important feature of the
existing system for defining criminal law. Lawmaking and law enforcement are given to different institutions, in part to diffuse power,
but the institutions are usually seeking the same ends. Since the institutions can also communicate—prosecutors can tell legislatures
what legislation they need—the separation of crime definition and enforcement is less important, and less substantial, than one would
296
think.

Stuntz’s proposition that “[l]egislators are better off when pros297
ecutors are better off,” and of the resultant influence that
prosecutors have over legislators, supports the idea that adjustment of prosecutorial incentives could have effects beyond
the prosecutorial branch.
D. WHETHER LEVERAGE COULD BE APPLIED
Even if applying leverage to the prosecutorial branch
makes sense, one must still ask whether and how the legislature could be persuaded to apply the leverage by abandoning
automatic exclusions.
294. See Ben David, Community-Based Prosecution in North Carolina: An
Inside-Out Approach to Public Service at the Courthouse, on the Street, and in
the Classroom, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 373, 385 (2012) (discussing district
attorney participation in law enforcement training in the Fifth District of
North Carolina); Marc L. Miller & Samantha Caplinger, Prosecution in Arizona: Practical Problems, Prosecutorial Accountability, and Local Solutions, 41
CRIME & JUST. 265, 297 (2012) (discussing training provided by the Pinal
County Attorney's Office to all local police officers).
295. See Whitney Tymas, Director, Prosecution and Racial Justice, Vera
Inst. of Justice, Address at the Center on the Administration of Criminal Law
Fourth Annual Conference: New Frontiers in Race & Criminal Justice (Apr.
17, 2012), available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/adminofcriminallaw/
events/newfrontiers (“Prosecutors need to understand the real leadership they
can exercise when it comes to not endorsing all police action. . . . It’s really OK
to tell the police officer, ‘I’m not prosecuting this case.’ . . . Prosecutors can say
no, and not just be case processers—really be leaders.”).
296. Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 158, at 534–35.
297. Id. at 510 (adding that “judges cannot separate these natural allies”);
see Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration, supra note 241, at 315 (“Politicians
want to keep the powerful interests and the public happy, and that means giving the Department [of Justice] what it wants.”).
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As stated above, those with criminal convictions hold little
298
sway with the legislature. Yet this proposal does not lie at
299
the “soft on crime” core of legislative anxiety. It is less likely
to provoke legislative reluctance than the other ways in which
the harms caused by these exclusions could be lessened: fewer
300
felonies, for examples, or crimes, or prosecutions, or the ex301
punction of criminal convictions after a certain period of time.
In addition, the proposal dovetails with the goal of reentry,
302
which is supported by federal and state legislation, and by
303
economic imperatives.
The surest indication that abandonment of automatic exclusions is possible is that several states have done it. Both
Colorado and Maine have abandoned their statutory disqualifi298. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
299. See Gershowitz, supra note 278, at 47 (defending the viability of his
proposal that prosecutors be regularly informed about jail and prison overcrowding, on the ground that “because legislatures would simply be instructing that prosecutors be advised of the scale of imprisonment, and not specifically advocating lower sentences, there would be no danger of legislators
appearing ‘soft on crime’”); id. at 80 (“[L]egislators are not averse to criminal
justice reforms that will not carry the soft on crime label.”).
300. See Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 158, at 566 (“Over the
course of the past century the number of criminal charges filed has increased
very substantially . . . .”).
301. See Demleitner, supra note 119, at 162 (“To prevent such negative collateral consequences for ex-offenders, a more comprehensive solution, adopted
in some states, is needed: the expungement of criminal records after a certain
period of time following the end of a sentence.”).
302. For federal legislation, see Second Chance Act of 2007: Community
Safety Through Recidivism Prevention, Pub. L. No. 110-99, 122 Stat. 657, 658
(2008) (listing among the stated purposes “to provide offenders in prisons, jails
or juvenile facilities with educational, literacy, vocational, and job placement
services to facilitate re-entry into the community,” and “to encourage the development and support of, and to expand the availability of, evidence-based
programs that enhance public safety and reduce recidivism, such as substance
abuse treatment, alternatives to incarceration, and comprehensive reentry
services”); Cole, supra note 133, at 32 (discussing passage of federal Second
Chance Act). For state legislation, see, for example, the recent addition of a
reentry and reintegration component to the purposes of New York’s Penal
Law, which include “[i]nsur[ing] the public safety by preventing the commission of offenses through the deterrent influence of the sentences authorized,
the rehabilitation of those convicted, the promotion of their successful and productive reentry and reintegration into society, and their confinement when required in the interests of public protection.” N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05 (McKinney
2006) (emphasis added).
303. See JOHN ROMAN & AARON CHALFIN, URBAN INSTITUTE, DOES IT PAY
TO INVEST IN REENTRY PROGRAMS FOR JAIL INMATES? JAIL REENTRY
ROUNDTABLE INITIATIVE 19–23 (2006), available at http://www.urban.org/
projects/reentry-roundtable/upload/roman_chalfin.pdf.
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304

cation provisions. North Dakota, whose statutory disqualifi305
cation provision applies only to those who are in prison, has
abandoned criminal convictions as an automatic basis for exclusions for cause, and now requires that any court granting a
306
challenge for cause find “[other] grounds.” Iowa has also rejected automatic exclusions, relying instead on challenges for
cause that permit the judge to make an individualized deter307
mination about fitness.
E. IF LEVERAGE FAILS
Adopting this proposal may have only a modest effect, either as regards leveraging investigation or reform, or as regards permitting a broader segment of the community to serve
on juries. Even a modest effect in this area would be worth308
while. In addition, whether or not it leverages investigation
or reform, and whether or not it permits a broader segment of
the community to serve, the abandonment of automatic exclusions would bring benefits. First, with regard to the expressive
power of the law, the message of automatic unfitness—and the
tension that it creates with messages of reintegration—would
be gone. Second, the requirement that an attorney should be
able to challenge a juror for cause only if that juror has demonstrated an individual bias would make it more likely that those
present in the courtroom at the time of jury selection would
hear an individual account of the experience of passing through
the criminal justice system. The lawyers and the judge would
ask and hear about what that experience was, and whether indeed it was embittering. Such an account is largely absent from
309
the criminal courtroom; provided that ways can be found to
310
protect the privacy of potential jurors, its addition would be
valuable.

304. See supra Part I.B.
305. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-33-01(1)(a), 27-09.1-08 (2013).
306. See supra note 59.
307. See supra note 58.
308. See Gershowitz, supra note 278, at 67 (“[W]hile additional information
[about incarceration rates and prison crowding] will not foster drastic behavioral changes, it is quite possible that it could change behavior at the margins .
. . .”).
309. See Natapoff, Speechless, supra note 17, at 1452.
310. One method would be in camera questioning in the presence of only
the parties and the judge, should the potential juror request it.
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The current lack of investigation into the questions that
311
these jurors would answer during voir dire is problematic.
Sharon Dolovich has written powerfully about the idea that our
penal policies should be shaped by those acting as if behind a
veil—unaware of whether they will end up with the keys or in
the cell, but aware of the circumstances affecting everyone in312
volved. Under that view, both judges and attorneys—each of
whom plays a part in shaping the criminal justice system—
should have a way of learning how things are in the cell. Mak313
ing social realities understood is a step toward their reform.
Even putting the veil to one side, there is good reason to listen
to first-hand accounts. As noted above, procedural justice is
concerned with how the person who passed through the criminal justice system views the procedures to which he or she was
314
exposed. Thus, those who oversee the system and its procedures should heed the thoughts and views of those who have
been subject to them. Particular facets of the role of both judge
and prosecutor make the voice of the potential juror especially
vital.
In the case of judges, Jack Weinstein has written of the
risk that they become too remote from those whose lives they
315
shape. This risk of remoteness is magnified by the silencing

311. See Roberts, Cost of Mass Incarceration, supra note 130, at 1300 (arguing that policymaking about incarceration has “yet to grasp the monumental
devastation of prison growth on people’s lives”).
312. Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment, supra note 188, at 315–16.
313. See United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (“[W]e sacrifice a great deal by discouraging the [defendant’s ‘rotten social background’] defense. If we could remove the practical
impediments to the free flow of information we might begin to learn something
about the causes of crime. We might discover, for example, that there is a significant causal relationship between violent criminal behavior and a ‘rotten
social background.’ That realization would require us to consider, for example,
whether income redistribution and social reconstruction are indispensable
first steps toward solving the problem of violent crime.”); Gershowitz, supra
note 278, at 67–72 (drawing on social psychology research on the influence of
information on behavior in support of his proposal that prosecutors be educated about prison and jail overcrowding).
314. See supra Part III.D.
315. Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for
the People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1,
25–26 (2008) (“Judges often deal with people living ‘lives of silent desperation,’
who look to us for understanding. A judge’s experiences in and out of court—
aided by that of jurors—is critical to this vital rapport factor. . . . As judges,
successful and with friends from affluent classes, we are too often out of touch
emotionally with the people before us.”); id. at 26 (“[I]t is difficult to find the
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of criminal defendants and the assumptions (and stereotypes)
about criminal defendants and the criminal justice system that
316
are likely to spring up to fill the silence; conversation could
reduce remoteness, and replace assumptions and stereotypes
317
with knowledge. Judges are vulnerable to implicit, or unconscious, bias, which is liable to affect the decisions that they
318
make about defendants; one possible antidote to the type of
stereotyping encompassed within implicit bias is individuating
319
information.
In the case of prosecutors, the opportunity to learn individuating information about former criminal defendants would
also be valuable, given prosecutorial vulnerability to implicit
320
bias. In addition, learning about the experiences of those exposed to a criminal justice system in which prosecutors play
such a powerful role seems central to a prosecutor’s duties.
Prosecutors have a duty to see that procedural justice is protime or opportunity to recharge our batteries of compassion by meeting and
helping people in our deprived communities.”).
316. See Rubio v. Super. Ct., 593 P.2d 595, 606 (Cal. 1979) (en banc)
(Tobriner, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for making unsupported assumptions about those with felony convictions); id. at 611–12 (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (same).
317. See Natapoff, Speechless, supra note 17, at 1500–01 (“[D]efendant silence means that there is little empathetic or education impetus for change in
the perceptions and predispositions of these institutional decisionmakers. . . .
[This] silence is a recipe for continued institutional hostility.”).
318. See Darrell A. H. Miller, Iqbal & Empathy, 78 UMKC L. REV. 999,
1008 (2010).
319. See Dolovich, Exclusion and Control, supra note 131, at 266–67 (arguing that “a political strategy emphasizing the financial costs of incarceration is
bound to fail unless it also generates an ideological reorientation towards recognizing the people the state incarcerates as fellow human beings and fellow
citizens, entitled to respect and consideration as such”); Gregory Mitchell &
Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67
OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1114 (2006) (“[S]tereotype effects recede as people learn
more about each other as individuals, with individuating information often
overwhelming stereotype information.”); Natapoff, Speechless, supra note 17,
at 1503 (mentioning the challenge “to reconceptualize defendants as speakers
rather than objects of litigation, to turn them from abstract ‘juridical subject[s]’ into thinking, feeling human beings from whom, as a society, we need
to hear”).
320. See ALEXANDER, supra note 75, at 115 (“Numerous studies have
shown that prosecutors interpret and respond to identical criminal activity
differently based on the race of the offender.”); Justin D. Levinson, Race,
Death, and the Complicitous Mind, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 599, 617 (2009) (citing
research indicating that implicit bias among prosecutors may lead to racial
disparities in capital cases, and that unconscious bias may affect prosecutors
even more than others).
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321

vided to every defendant; and, more broadly, to see that jus322
323
tice is served; to reform the system; and to represent “the
People.” It is hard to imagine how they can meet any of those
duties without hearing from that portion of the people that has
been convicted, particularly without hearing how they view the
324
criminal justice system and their experience within it. The
inability of this group to be heard by prosecutors is a striking
325
facet of the lack of prosecutorial accountability.
In the case of both judges and prosecutors, the failure to
receive feedback from those who experience the convictions and
punishments that they help bring about hinders the prospects
of reform. Natapoff has described the fact that judges and prosecutors “almost never” hear from defendants as a “process fail326
ure,”
and a “systemic dysfunction that impedes progress
327
within the criminal system.” Her detailed recitation of the
harms to judges and prosecutors, and to society more generally,
caused by the silencing of defendants during the progression of
321. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2013).
322. For rules emphasizing that the prosecution’s duty is to do justice, rather than obtain convictions, see id.; AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 4 (Standard
3-1.2) (3d ed. 1992); id. at 9; MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13
(1980).
323. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 322, at 4 (Standard 3-1.2(d)) (stating
prosecutors’ duty to “seek to reform and improve the administration of criminal justice”); id. (stating that a prosecutor is duty-bound to try to correct substantive and procedural inadequacies and injustices).
324. See Howard, supra note 86, at 418 (prosecutors should “embrace the
diversity of opinion that a community cross-section brings to a venire, and, ultimately, the jury”).
325. See supra note 271.
326. Natapoff, Speechless, supra note 17, at 1452 (“Since defendants speak
for themselves so infrequently, judges, prosecutors, and lawmakers almost
never hear from them, and the democratic processes that generate our justice
system proceed without those voices. This process failure reinforces the social
and psychological gaps between defendants and those who adjudicate them.”);
id. at 1457 (mentioning “the institutional loss of information about defendant
perceptions and experiences that might enable the judicial and political
spheres to respond better to those who populate the criminal justice system”);
id. at 1487 (“Criminal defendants are excluded from the ‘marketplace of ideas’
that shapes the criminal justice system. Spoken for and about by lawyers,
criminologists, legislators, and law enforcement, defendants rarely share their
own views on the criminal process: Is it fair? Does it deter? Does it seem cruel
or lenient? Legitimate or overbearing? Rational or random? At no point during
the criminal process can defendants safely share their thoughts on these matters, and afterwards, in prison or on release, the opportunities to speak are
even more scarce.”).
327. Id. at 1503.
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their cases—all the lost opportunities for learning and reform—
applies with full force to the failure of judges and prosecutors to
hear from those who are kept from jury service by their convic328
tions. As things stand, “[i]f the system was intended to keep
society substantially clueless about the people it incarcerates, it
329
could not have been better designed.” In addition, regardless
of anything that potential jurors may say about their experience in the criminal justice system, merely by being present in
the jury box, these jurors will speak through their numerosity
about the breadth of criminalization, sending a message that
may be silenced by automatic exclusions, and that may prompt
330
reform, or at least reflection.
CONCLUSION
Automatic jury exclusions of those with criminal records
should be abandoned. They are not needed to ensure fairness;
the challenge for cause exists for cases of demonstrated bias.
Indeed, they increase unfairness, by enhancing racial disparities, impeding reentry, and insisting that only those who lack a
particular type of knowledge of the criminal justice system can
scrutinize it. Limiting cost-free jury removals to those instances
where bias can be shown would require attorneys and judges to
hear and address what potential jurors say about their criminal
justice experience. Imposing a litigation cost for all other removals would require prosecutors to internalize the cost of the
embitterment that they assume. Let the cost of a criminal justice system so embittering as to preclude its fair consideration
be borne by those who create and perpetuate it.
328. See id. at 1498–1501. For example, the system would “obtain more information about law enforcement and how police behave, in ways that suppression hearings rarely permit because defendants face incrimination if they
take the stand. Every aspect of criminal justice . . . could be evaluated in light
of its actual effects on its intended targets.” Id. at 1499; see also id. at 1501–02
(“Defendant silence . . . reinforces legal norms of punitiveness, hostility, and
incomprehension. . . . Because it eliminates the primary voices that might be
raised against harsh practices including long sentences, inhumane prison conditions, and deprivations of rights upon conviction, defendant silence helps to
validate such practices.”).
329. Id. at 1499. Besides not hearing about individual experiences, judges
and prosecutors never hear the “full story” about “the functioning of the justice
system itself.” Id.
330. Compare this proposal to Gershowitz’s suggestion that prosecutors be
told of prison and jail crowding, in the hope, backed by social psychology research, that these figures have some effect on prosecutorial behavior.
Gershowitz, supra note 278, at 67.

